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Abstract 
We examine the Norwegian preferential beef import from Botswana and 
Namibia, which is administered under two different quota-schemes. The 
General System of Preferences (GSP) quota of 2,700 tons is allocated to 
Norwegian importers on a first-come, first-served (FCFS) basis and the 
EFTA/SACU quota of 500 tons is allocated through an auction. In addition, the 
quotas are administered through firm-specific allocations within Botswana and 
Namibia. We investigate which stakeholders benefit from the way the two 
quotas are allocated by analyzing price data collected from different levels of 
the value chain. Our main findings are that the exporting and importing firms 
benefit most from the trade, and that the specific quota allocation method 
impacts whether exporters or importers have the most bargaining power. We 
also find evidence that the Norwegian government obtains some profits. 
Finally, we argue that the preferential beef trade is justifiable in the light of 
Norwegian development objectives. However, there is a potential risk that the 
exporters seem to become too dependent on the Norwegian preferential trade.
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Introduction 
Botswana and Namibia are today eligible to export 3,200 tons of bovine meat 
duty-free to Norway on an annual basis. The export to Norway is regulated 
under two different quota-schemes, the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) and the EFTA/SACU quota. Botswana and Namibia were approved for 
export in 1995, and exporters have since then had preferential and duty-free 
market access to Norway. Export of bovine meat from Botswana to Norway 
started in 1996 and continues today, while Namibia had some problems in the 
beginning with salmonella and did not export continuously on an annual basis 
before 1998 (Sunnevåg, 1999).  
We found this particular beef trade to be an interesting research subject for 
several reasons. First of all, the import from Botswana and Namibia has been 
highly debated in Norway and in the two exporting countries. Both Botswana 
and Namibia are recipients of special treatment, since they can export duty-free 
to Norway even though they are not classified as least developed countries 
(LDCs). There is also an on-going debate about the quota allocation methods. 
The fact that the trade is allocated by two different quota-schemes, makes the 
research interesting.  
Further, there has not been conducted much research on the economics of quota 
administration. A more recent paper by Khandelwal, et al. (2012), reviews the 
productivity of Chinese textile firms before and after deregulation of a quota-
scheme. Their main findings imply that inefficient quota administration can 
exclude productive firms (Khandelwal, et al., 2012). Also, there has not been 
done a lot of research on this specific beef trade – as far as we know. Sunnevåg 
(1999) published a report discussing possible auction formats for the Botswana 
and Namibian beef quotas. Another paper by Rich, et al. (2012), was recently 
published through the Norwegian Institute of International affairs (NUPI). The 
aim of that paper was to explain Norwegian beef imports under the GSP and the 
paper includes a discussion about the beef import from Botswana and Namibia. 
Other papers published by NUPI also include discussions about this beef trade. 
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However, none of these papers aim to answer the question of who benefits from 
how the quotas are allocated. The exception is Sunnevåg (1999), who discussed 
this question in the context of auction formats.  
This thesis aims to answer this question, and it is therefore our main research 
topic. Since both Botswana and Namibia receive special treatment and are not 
classified as LDCs, we also find it necessary to discusses whether or not the 
trade is justifiable in the context of Norwegian development objectives. 
Research for this project was conducted through mostly electronic and public 
listed sources and through the economic literature. Our research is also based 
on interviews with some of the stakeholders in the beef trade, such as 
Norwegian importers and quota regulators (Norwegian Customs and the 
Norwegian Agricultural Authority).  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a quantitative 
overview of the beef trade. Chapter 2 reviews the origins of the beef trade with 
Botswana and Namibia, and discusses why these countries receive a special 
treatment. Chapter 3 analyzes the economic situations of Botswana and 
Namibia and the productivity of their respective beef sectors. The chapter 
further reviews how these issues comply with Norwegian development 
objectives. In chapter 4, we present an overview of relevant quota allocation 
theory and the mechanisms behind the current quota allocation methods. 
Chapter 5 describes the different exporting and importing firms and what some 
of their interests are regarding the allocation methods. In chapter 6, we use 
various price data to estimate which of the stakeholders profit from the beef 
trade. Finally, we have discussed our concluding remarks.  
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  Chapter 1 
An overview of the beef trade 
1.1 Quantity and commodity regulations 
As mentioned, the Norwegian beef trade with Botswana and Namibia consists 
of total 3,200 tons of bovine meat and is regulated under two different quota-
schemes. These two quota-schemes differ when it comes to quantity and which 
products it is allowed to export. Exporters from Botswana and Namibia are 
eligible to export 2,700 tons under the GSP quota, and 500 tons under the 
EFTA/SACU quota. The GSP quota was implemented in 1995, while the 
EFTA/SACU quota came into force in 2008. The GSP quota only opens for 
import of a few specific boneless beef products, which are steaks and fillets and 
other cuts of meat (table 1). The bovine meat can either be imported 
fresh/chilled or frozen.  
Table 1: List of commodity codes eligible for trade under the GSP quota. 
 Source: (NC, 2013a). 
The EFTA/SACU quota is on the other hand more flexible, and allows 
importers to import bovine meat with bones (table 2). This quota covers bone-in 
Commodity code Description 
02.01.3001 Beef steaks and fillets of bovine 
animals. Fresh or chilled (boneless).  
02.01.3009 Other meat of bovine animals. 
Except carcasses, quarters and 
“pistola-cuts”. Fresh or chilled 
(boneless). 
02.02.3001 Beef steaks and fillets of bovine 
animals. Frozen (boneless). 
02.02.3009 Other meat of bovine animals. 
Except carcasses, quarters and 
“pistola-cuts”. Frozen (boneless). 
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meat such as carcasses, forequarters, hindquarters and so- called “pistola-cuts”.1 
However, neither the importers nor the exporters have exploited this 
opportunity, and the beef trade has basically consisted of the commodity codes 
allowed under the GSP quota.  
Table 2: List of commodity codes eligible for trade under the EFTA/SACU quota.  
 Source: (EFTA/SACU, 2006). 
1.2 Trade data 
1.2.1 The import quantity  
After the implementation of the EFTA/SACU quota in 2008, there has been an 
increase in the total quantity imported from Botswana and Namibia. There has 
also been a change in which of the two countries it has been most popular to 
import from. Figure 1 shows the annual quota import of beef from Botswana 
and Namibia in the period between 1996 and 2012. During the 1990’s, most of 
the beef allowed imported under these quota-schemes came from Botswana. 
More recently, a larger share of the import has been of Namibian origin; almost 
90 per cent of the total trade in 2011 and 2012. The main reason for this is that 
Botswana was banned from the trade due to recent outbreaks of foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) (Agritrade, 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed list of what the commodity codes in table 2 include, see Appendix A.  
Commodity code Description 
02.01 Meat of bovine animals, 
fresh or chilled. 
02.02 Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen.  
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Figure 1: Bovine meat import from Botswana and Namibia (1996-2012).  
 
Note: The figure exhibits the quantity of Norwegian beef import from Botswana and Namibia 
between 1996 and 2012. The figure only includes the quantity of bovine meat imported under 
the two quota-schemes; GSP and EFTA/SACU. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
The utilization rate of the GSP quota (2,700 tons) from 1996 to 2007 is 
illustrated in figure 2. The utilization of this quota has varied since it was 
implemented in 1996. So far, the lowest amount of import occurred in year 
2000. The utilization rate of the GSP and EFTA/SACU quotas (2,700 tons plus 
500 tons) is illustrated in figure 3. Since 2008, the aggregated utilization rate of 
these two quotas has been close to 100 per cent. 
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Figure 2: The utilization rate of the GSP quota (1996-2007). 
   
Note: The figure exhibits the utilization rate of the GSP quota. The maximum quantity of 
import allowed duty-free from Botswana and Namibia was 2,700 tons in the years between 
1996 and 2007. The EFTA/SACU quota was not implemented before 2008. Source: (Statistics 
Norway, 2013a).  
 
Figure 3: The aggregated utilization rate of the GSP and EFTA/SACU quotas (2008-2012). 
 
Note: The figure exhibits the utilization rate of the GSP and EFTA/SACU quotas. Between 
2008 and 2012, the maximum quantity of beef allowed to export duty-free under these quotas 
was 3,200 (2,700 + 500) tons. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a).  
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The magnitude of beef import from Botswana and Namibia compared with the 
total Norwegian import of similar products is illustrated in figure 4. Hence, 
carcasses are excluded and the commodities included are boneless beef steaks 
and fillets and other boneless cuts of meat. It is appropriate to do such a 
comparison, since these are the only commodities imported under the two 
quota-schemes for Botswana and Namibia. Further, bone-in products, allowed 
to be imported under the EFTA/SACU quota, are limited in world trade due to 
strict health requirements and the increased risk of FMD outbreaks (Rich, et 
al., 2012). 
Figure 4: Botswana and Namibia’s share of total Norwegian import of specific beef 
commodities (1996-2012). 
    
Note: The figure exhibits the import (measured in tons) from Botswana and Namibia under the 
two quota-schemes (GSP + EFTA/SACU) as a share of total Norwegian import of the specific 
commodity codes listed table 1. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
The Botswana and Namibian share of total import of the specific commodities 
has held a steady rate since the beginning in 1996. The maximum share was 
approximately 72 per cent in the years 1997 and 2009. The lowest share was 46 
per cent in 2000. In recent years, the share has been around 60 per cent of total 
import. These numbers imply that the import from Botswana and Namibia 
counts for a substantial part of the total import of steaks and fillets and other 
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cuts of meat. However, if one reviews the percentage share of total Norwegian 
import of beef, the magnitude of the Botswana and Namibian import is reduced. 
When all imports of bovine meat, such as carcasses and bone-in products are 
included in the calculation, the picture becomes suddenly quite different.  This 
percentage share of import is illustrated in figure 5. Here, one can clearly see 
that the Botswana and Namibian share of total import has varied a lot since the 
beginning in 1996. In 1999, the share was accounted to be as high as 70 per 
cent. However, the magnitude of the trade compared with total trade has been 
quite modest in the two most recent years. In 2012, the share was 
approximately 17 per cent, which is accounted to be the lowest share ever.       
Figure 5: Botswana and Namibia’s share of total Norwegian beef import (1996-2012). 
 
Note: The figure exhibits the import (measured in tons) from Botswana and Namibia under the 
two quota-schemes (GSP + EFTA/SACU) as a share of total Norwegian import of beef 
including all the commodity codes of beef (Appendix A). Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
The declining share of import is due to Norway’s beef production deficit. 
Hence, the import from other beef exporting countries has increased. This 
situation currently makes Norway the world’s third largest export market for 
beef. In 2012, Norway produced approximately 78,000 tons of beef, while 
Norwegians consumed 95,000 tons. The production deficit of 17,000 tons 
therefore had to be covered by import. Recently, more dairy cows have been 
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slaughtered and production is therefore estimated to have increased slightly. 
Import of beef is therefore estimated to be approximately 15,000 tons in 2013. 
8,300 tons are expected to be imported under reduced tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs), while the rest is expected to be imported either under a duty-free 
quota- scheme or charged full duty. The European Union (EU) is also 
experiencing a similar situation (NAA, 2012). It therefore looks like the import 
of beef to Norway and the EU will not diminish drastically any time soon.   
1.2.2 Value of the import 
The quantity of beef from Botswana and Namibia is not the only measure that 
has increased in recent years. The import value from these countries has also 
increased. The estimated values of the beef trade from Botswana and Namibia 
under the two quota-schemes are illustrated in figure 6. This figure also 
includes the value of total import of the commodities specified in table 1. This 
measure can be reviewed as the amounts paid by Norwegian importers to 
exporters in Botswana and Namibia. It should, however, be mentioned that 
these values include transportation and insurance costs (Statistics Norway, 
2013b).  
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Figure 6: The value of beef import from Botswana and Namibia (1996-2012). 
 
Note:  The figure exhibits the value of the import from Botswana and Namibia under the two 
quota-schemes (GSP + EFTA/SACU), and also the value of the total Norwegian import of the 
specific commodity codes (02.01.3001, 02.01.3009, 02.02.3001 and 02.02.3009). These values 
are adjusted for inflation.2 Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
The minimum value the beef trade has had since its beginning in 1996 has been 
approximately 51 million NOK (in 2000), while the maximum value has been 
almost 233 million NOK (in 2012). The value of the trade with Namibia has 
had an increasing rate since the beginning of the last decade, and has had a 
significant increase during the last two years. Although the import value from 
Botswana has decreased since 2010, the overall import value from the two 
countries has increased. This is an interesting trend, since the quantity allowed 
to be imported under these quota- schemes has been the same since 2008. 
As mentioned, a larger share of the two quotas has been imported from 
Namibia (figure 1), but since the maximum quantity allowed has been the 
same, and the fact that the utilization rate has been almost the same (actually a 
bit lower in 2012), this might imply that importers in Norway have paid a 
                                                 
2 The numbers are adjusted for inflation by estimating how much 1 NOK in one particular year 
would be worth in 2012 (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
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higher price for the beef during the last two years. In 2009, the import value 
from Botswana and Namibia was approximately 147 million NOK, while 233 
million NOK in 2012.  From 2010 to 2011, the value of import from Namibia 
increased by approximately 86 million. However, the value of the trade with 
other countries also increased drastically in 2011 and 2012, even though the 
quantity has been fairly stable since 2001. From 2011 to 2012, the quantity 
imported increased by approximately 350 tons, while the value increased by 66 
million NOK. This indicates that beef prices generally have increased in recent 
years.  
Steaks and fillets have a higher value than cuts of beef, both for fresh/chilled 
and frozen meat. Figure 7 provides an illustration of the difference between the 
average price (NOK) per kilo paid for fresh/chilled steaks and fillets compared 
to cuts of beef. The figure is an aggregate of the prices paid to exporters in 
Botswana and Namibia, and in recent years, the price difference between 
steaks and fillets and cuts of beef has been large. In 2011 and 2012, importers 
paid on average a price of 98 NOK and 105 NOK per kilo for steaks and fillets. 
The price paid for other cuts of beef however, was 46 and 58.5 NOK per kilo. 
Figure 8 exhibits an illustration of prices paid for frozen steaks and fillets 
compared to cuts of beef. This figure is also an aggregate of the average prices 
paid to exporters in Botswana and Namibia. Since 2008, importers have paid a 
higher price for frozen steaks and fillets compared to cuts of beef. In 2011 and 
2012, importers paid on average a price of 56 NOK and 60 NOK per kilo for 
steaks and fillets. At the same time, the price paid for other cuts of beef was 47 
NOK and 49 NOK per kilo.  
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Figure 7: Price paid by Norwegian importers for fresh/chilled steaks and fillets compared to 
other cuts of beef (1996-2012).   
Note: The figure exhibits an aggregate of the prices paid for fresh/chilled beef (steaks and 
fillets and other cuts of meat) by Norwegian importers to exporters in Botswana and Namibia. 
The prices are given in NOK and are adjusted for inflation.3 Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The numbers are adjusted for inflation by estimating how much 1 NOK in one particular year would be 
worth in 2012 (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
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Figure 8: Price paid by Norwegian importers for frozen steaks and fillets compared to other 
cuts of beef (1996-2012).   
Note: The figure exhibits an aggregate of the prices paid for frozen beef (steaks and fillets and 
other cuts of meat) by Norwegian importers to exporters in Botswana and Namibia. The prices 
are given in NOK and are adjusted for inflation.4 Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
 
                                                 
4 The numbers are adjusted for inflation by estimating how much 1 NOK in one particular year would be 
worth in 2012 (Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
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Chapter 2 
Unique preferential trade  
The Norwegian preferential beef trade is regulated by international trade rules 
and agreements. Under these terms, Botswana and Namibia are granted the 
special quotas for duty-free export of beef to Norway. There are historical 
reasons why Botswana and Namibia are granted this particular treatment, which 
is unique compared to Norwegian trade with other developing countries. 
2.1 The Generalized System of Preferences 
2.1.1 Origins of GSP  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the largest multinational organisation 
for trade negotiations between countries and currently consists of 159 member 
states (WTO, 2013a). The basis of the trade-negotiations in the WTO is the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was ratified in 1947. 
The GATT is an agreement for regulating international trade with goods, with a 
general objective of reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. GATT article 1 
states that if one member grants another member a particular trade privilege, 
this privilege must also be expanded to apply for all other GATT members. 
This is known as the “Most Favored Nation”-treatment (MFN), and is an 
important feature of trade negotiations in the WTO (WTO, 2013b). 
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established in 1968 
(UNCTAD, 2012a). The WTO defines GSP as “(…) programmes by developed 
countries granting preferential tariffs to imports from developing countries” 
(WTO, 2013c). Examples of preferential tariffs are tariff reductions or duty-free 
export of certain goods. Developed countries offering GSP do not expect to be 
offered the same treatment in return from developing countries. Nor do they 
offer the same treatment to other developed members (WTO, 2013d). The GSP 
is thus not in compliance with the principle of MFN-treatment. 
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In 1979, the GATT-members agreed that GSP should be permanently allowed, 
and the scheme is currently included in WTO regulations under the name 
“Enabling Clause” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). By 2012, 11 
WTO members offered GSP-treatment to developing countries, including 
Norway, the EU and the United States (UNCTAD, 2012a). 
2.1.2 Different treatment under GSP 
To contribute to economic growth was the main objective of the GSP. Trade 
through GSP-schemes could lead to enhanced export revenues and 
industrialization promotion in developing countries, thus spurring economic 
growth. Initially, all developing countries were to be treated similarly under the 
scheme. Least developed countries (LDCs) however, have generally been 
granted more preferences than other developing countries (Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2007). In the WTO, members may decide themselves 
whether they should be classified as a developing or developed country. 
However, special criteria must be fulfilled in order to be granted LDC status 
(Melchior, 2005a). The WTO follows the list set by the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) of which countries that are LDCs. Currently, 34 
WTO-members have LDC status (WTO, 2013e). To be considered an LDC by 
ECOSOC, and thus by the WTO, a country must fulfill four criteria.5 Few 
countries have ever graduated from the LDC group (ECOSOC, 2013). 
                                                 
5 LDC criteria (ECOSOC, 2013): 
1) Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of less than $992 a year. 
2) Low scores on the Human Asset Index which measures level of education, literacy, nutrition 
and child mortality. 
3) Low scores on the Economic Vulnerability Index which among others regards a country’s 
exports, demography, geographic vulnerability and instability of agricultural production. 
4) Population of less than 75 million. 
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2.2 The Norwegian GSP 
Norway implemented its GSP-scheme in 1971, and has since gradually opened 
up for more duty-free imports from developing countries. All LDCs obtained 
duty-free and quota-free market access (DFQF MA) for goods in 2002, 
including agricultural products (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).6 
Generally, agricultural products imported to Norway face high tariff rates. This 
is especially prevalent for so called “non-processed goods”, like meat. LDCs 
such have an advantage compared to other countries, as they may export 
agricultural products duty-free (Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 
2008). On the other hand, for non-agricultural products, Norway has removed 
all tariff lines.7 LDCs have therefore few advantages compared to other 
countries when it comes to these products (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2007). Norway grants GSP-treatment to all developing countries. 
However, the system offers separate treatment to countries of different level of 
development. The system was updated in January 2013 and Norway now offers 
various GSP-treatments to three different country categories. These various 
GSP-treatments are illustrated in table 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In 2008, this treatment was expanded to include 14 low-income countries. 
7 There are exceptions for some product lines, mainly textiles and clothes. 
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Table 3: Various GSP-treatments offered by Norway. 
Category of GSP- 
treatment 
Definition Tariff reductions 
LDCs  46 LDCs and 13 low 
income countries with 
less than 75 million 
inhabitants.   
Duty-free and quota-free 
market access for all 
export products. 
GSP+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 lower middle-income 
countries with less than 
75 million inhabitants.  
Tariff reductions on 
clothes and textiles. 
Significant tariff 
reductions on certain 
food products. For 
import of other 
agricultural products, 
the exporters receive a 
tariff reduction between 
10 and 100 per cent of 
the general tariff. All 
other goods may be 
exported duty-free. 
Ordinary GSP 48 developing countries. 
Botswana and Namibia 
are categorized in this 
group, but treated 
differently than others. 
Tariff reductions 
between 10 and 100 per 
cent on agricultural 
products. No tariff 
reductions on certain 
clothes and textile 
products. All other 
goods may be exported 
duty-free. 
Source: (NC, 2013b) and (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). 
In accordance with the structure of the Norwegian GSP, poorer countries are 
granted greater trade preferences. Norway categorizes countries into the 
different GSP groups based on reviews by the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD DAC) annually reviews which countries are LDCs and 
upper- and middle-income developing countries. (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012). According to the list of 2013, a country regarded as an 
LDC or other low income country had a GNI of less than $1005 per capita in 
2010 (OECD DAC, 2013a). The LDC GNI criterion of OECD is very similar to 
the ECOSOC criterion, meaning that Norway and WTO do not differ much in 
their categorization of LDCs.  
 29 
2.3 Norwegian preferential beef trade  
2.3.1 Beef import from LDCs 
Between 1934 and 1995, quota regulated import of meat to Norway was based 
on underlying consumer demand (Nortura, 2013a). Since 1995, WTO 
regulations have imposed Norway to administer various quotas for meat import 
to reduced tariffs (Nortura, 2013b). The Norwegian Parliament decided in 1995 
that LDCs could export 2,700 tons of beef duty-free to Norway on an annual 
basis. This was included in the GSP-scheme, but in addition to other WTO-
quotas for tariff reduced beef import (Nortura, 2013a). The Norwegian 
government analyzed the market for bovine meat in Norway, and determined 
that an import of 2,700 tons of boneless meat would not disturb the domestic 
Norwegian beef market (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2000). Norwegian 
authorities are eligible to cease the duty-free import of beef if it is regarded to 
disturb the domestic beef marked. This is known as the so-called “safety 
mechanism” (Norwegian Law, 2008). 
Botswana graduated from LDC status in 1994 and Namibia has never had LDC 
status (UNCTAD, 2012b). Still, both countries were included in the LDC group 
who could export 2,700 tons of beef duty-free to Norway. The quota was 
originally open for beef import from all LDCs. However, since Botswana and 
Namibia were the only countries who met Norwegian health requirements, they 
were the only countries in the LDC group approved for exporting beef to 
Norway (Bævre, et al., 2000). Hence, Norwegian firms imported only from 
Botswana and Namibia under the GSP quota (Nortura, 2013a). As mentioned, 
LDCs were granted duty-free and quota-free export of all their products to 
Norway in 2002, including beef. The GSP quota of 2,700 tons thus became in 
excess for LDCs. Botswana and Namibia were by then no longer categorized by 
Norway as LDCs (OECD DAC, 2003), but since they were the only countries 
who had utilized the beef quota in the past, the Norwegian government decided 
to continue to allowing them to export 2,700 tons of beef duty-free each year 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). 
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2.3.2 Special treatment of Botswana and Namibia 
The beef quota for Botswana and Namibia is now a separate feature under the 
GSP-scheme and is allocated by the Norwegian Customs (NC) on a “first-come, 
first-served” (FCFS) basis (NC, 2013b). Since Botswana and Namibia have 
been the only two countries who have utilized the possibility for beef export 
under the GSP, and cannot export more than 2,700 tons combined, there has 
never been any reason for implementing the “safety-mechanism”. 
The special treatment of Botswana and Namibia is a unique feature of the 
Norwegian GSP-scheme. Botswana and Namibia had a GNI per capita of 
respectively 7,470 and 4,700 US dollars in 2011 (The World Bank, 2013a; The 
World Bank, 2013b)8, and are thus classified as upper-middle income countries 
by the OECD DAC. According to the OECD DAC’s lists over aid receiving 
countries, Botswana became an upper-middle income country in 2000 and 
Namibia in 2011 (OECD DAC, 2013a). In accordance with the Norwegian 
GSP-scheme, Botswana and Namibia should be granted ordinary GSP benefits. 
When it comes to beef export, however, they receive beneficial trade treatment 
on a basis similar to how LDCs are treated (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2007). Other upper-middle income countries are not eligible for export 
of beef to Norway on the same basis (NC, 2013b). In 2009, Swaziland became 
the first low income country allowed to export beef to Norway under a duty-
free quota (Mittenzwei & Svennerud, 2010). The country has its own quota for 
duty-free beef export of 500 tons, which is allocated by the NC on a FCFS basis 
(NC, 2013b). 
2.4 FTA between EFTA and SACU 
The Norwegian beef import from Botswana and Namibia is not only regulated 
through the GSP-scheme. A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between The 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Southern African Customs 
                                                 
8 Not PPP- adjusted. 
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Union (SACU) allows for a certain amount of annual export of duty-free beef to 
Norway as well.  
EFTA was established in 1960, and today comprises of four countries: 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (EFTA, 2013). The current 
SACU agreement was signed in 2002, and SACU today comprises of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland (SACU, 2007). 
EFTA and SACU signed the FTA in 2006 and it was implemented in 2008 
(SACU, 2009). The objective of the FTA is to increase trade between the 
member countries and contribute to development by removing trade barriers 
(EFTA/SACU, 2006). Subjective to the FTA, three bilateral agricultural 
agreements were implemented in May 2008. Norway, Switzerland and Iceland 
each signed a bilateral agricultural agreement with SACU (Botswana Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, 2010). 
2.4.1 The Protocol on Beef 
Through the bilateral agricultural agreement between Norway and SACU, 
Norway offers tariff reductions between 10 and 100 per cent on many 
agricultural products. As a special feature of the agreement, 500 tons of beef 
may be exported to Norway duty-free each year. This beef must originate in 
Botswana or Namibia, as they were the only SACU states at the time qualified 
for beef export to Norway. The feature is known as “the Protocol on Beef” 
(Norway/SACU, 2006). Import licenses under the EFTA/SACU quota are 
allocated to Norwegian firms through an auction process, which is administered 
by the Norwegian Agricultural Authority (NAA, 2013a). Norway stated in the 
bilateral agricultural agreement to continue the duty-free beef quota under the 
GSP in addition to the implementation of the “Protocol on Beef” 
(Norway/SACU, 2006). Thus, Botswana and Namibia can in total export 3,200 
tons of beef duty-free to Norway annually under the two different quota-
schemes.   
Iceland and Switzerland have also signed bilateral agricultural agreements with 
SACU. Switzerland gives the SACU members some tariff preferences on 
bovine meat, but none of them offer duty-free export of beef or a beef quota 
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similar to the Norwegian “Protocol on Beef” (Iceland/SACU, 2006; 
SACU/Switzerland, 2006).  
2.5 SPS requirements and control 
As mentioned, Norwegian beef import is restricted by certain health 
requirements. These are set by the EU and this means that agricultural products, 
like beef, only can enter the Norwegian market if they are EU approved. Since 
the EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements are very strict, this 
limits the countries Norway can import beef from (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012).9 
The sanitary requirements for beef are: 
1) low levels of residues 
2) free of foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
 
Few developing countries manage to fulfill both these standards. Among low-
income countries, Swaziland is the only country fulfilling both SPS 
requirements (Melchior, et al., 2012a). Botswana and Namibia fulfill the 
residues requirements (Norwegian Law, 2011), and both countries have one 
zone regarded as free of FMD (OIE, 2013). It is thus allowed to import beef to 
Europe from these zones. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
makes the list of countries and geographical zones free of FMD.10   
It is a complicated process for developing countries to export beef to Europe. 
Exporters must first be approved by national authorities and this process is 
costly for both the domestic government and the exporting firms (Agritrade, 
2009). In February 2011, the Botswana government decided to halt all beef 
exports to the EU because of spread of FMD. This also suspended Botswana 
                                                 
9 For more detailed information about the EU-list of approved beef exporters:  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/establishments/third_country/index_en.htm 
10 For a review of OIE’s list of FMD free zones: http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-
world/official-disease-status/fmd/list-of-fmd-free-members 
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beef exports to Norway (Agritrade, 2012). The suspension lasted to June 2012, 
when Botswana veterinary authorities concluded that one of Botswana Meat 
Commission‘s (BMC) abattoirs was FMD free again (BMC, 2012). Beef from 
Botswana and Namibia is declared manually by a customs officer when it 
arrives in Norway. Beef transported directly to Norway is also controlled by the 
Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA). However, beef that has been 
approved by European veterinary authorities does not need to be controlled in 
Norway (NC, 2013c). 
2.6 The future of the beef import  
The WTO’s “Enabling Clause” states that the GSP-scheme is not supposed to 
discriminate between countries. In other words, a developed country member 
cannot give different tariff preferences to developing countries of the same 
poverty level. Discriminatory trade preferences may be trade impediments for 
some of the countries who are discriminated (Van den Bossche, 2008).  
Botswana and Namibia are treated by Norway as LDCs, although they are 
classified as upper-middle income countries, both by the WTO and the OECD. 
The current GSP quota of 2,700 tons of beef offered by Norway is therefore 
inconsistent with WTO rules, as no other upper-middle income country is 
offered this particular treatment. Other WTO-members have been critical to the 
way Botswana and Namibia receive special treatment (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012). Norway has taken this into consideration and decided to 
end the treatment of Botswana and Namibia as LDCs from 1 January 2013. In 
the future, the countries will receive GSP-treatment according to their 
developmental status. The market access of the GSP quota is planned to be 
included in the EFTA/SACU FTA (Norwegian Laws, 2013). This FTA is 
planned to be renegotiated by the end of 2013. In effect, this will not change the 
structure of the beef import. The GSP quota will still be administered by 
Norwegian Customs, be allocated on a FCFS basis and there are no plans to cut 
the amounts. The EFTA/SACU quota already included in the FTA will proceed 
as before and continue to be allocated through an auction. There are no plans to 
allocate the GPS quota through auctions (NC, 2013c). 
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According to Norwegian Customs, the Botswana and Namibian governments 
both put great value on the export of duty-free beef to Norway. Seemingly, they 
are afraid of losing their special treatment or to experience deteriorating trade 
benefits. Both Botswana and Namibia want the quota quantity to be augmented, 
but Norway does not intend to change the quantity. From Norwegian side, it is 
planned to achieve a more balanced FTA after the renegotiation. The current 
FTA is unbalanced in favor of the SACU countries, as they receive a lot of 
benefits while they do not grant many to Norway in return. As these countries 
are getting richer, however, and some of them soon will not be considered as 
developing countries any more, Norway wants an FTA which is based on more 
equal terms (NC, 2013c). 
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Chapter 3 
Beef trade and development 
Trade is regarded as an important engine for economic growth and development 
by many economists. Both Botswana and Namibia have experienced significant 
economic growth in recent decades. However, vital development issues still 
need to be resolved. The Norwegian government wants to contribute to further 
development in Botswana and Namibia, but it is unclear whether the effects of 
the beef trade comply with the Norwegian development objectives in the long 
run.   
3.1 Trade and development 
The concept of “development” is included in all social sciences and in political 
philosophy, and is thus defined as a normative economic concept (Tungodden, 
2012). Normative economics is defined as «economics that try to change the 
world, by suggesting policies for increasing economic welfare» (The 
Economist, 2004). The Norwegian government aims to facilitate economic 
growth and reduce poverty. Economic development and improvement of 
people’s welfare were the underlying objectives behind granting developing 
countries preferential trade treatment under the GSP (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012). 
In order to obtain sustainable economic development, international trade is 
vital. Most developed countries depend on international trade for economic 
growth. Trade can be positive in itself, because it might generate income and 
wealth. In addition, trade can have important economic spill-over effects, such 
as increased competitiveness and transfer of technology. Along with good 
governance, economic growth can be an important tool for poverty reduction 
(Hayashikawa, 2009). 
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Botswana and Namibia are, as mentioned, both classified as upper-middle 
income countries, and it is thus a question of how the beef trade with Norway 
can contribute to further economic development for them. Another question that 
needs to be raised is whether or not this trade is justifiable in light of 
Norwegian government objectives. To be able to discuss this, it is important to 
get an understanding of the economic situation in both Botswana and Namibia, 
review the productivity of the beef sectors and the Norwegian trade objectives. 
3.2 Botswana’s development  
3.2.1 History, economy and politics  
Botswana is a landlocked country located in Southern Africa. The country 
gained independence from Britain in 1966, and was at the time one of the 
poorest countries on the African continent. Today, Botswana is classified as an 
upper-middle income country and has experienced fast economic growth the 
last 50 years. The Botswana economy is primarily based on a profitable mining 
and diamond industry governed by a democratic government (The World Bank, 
2013c). In 2011, Botswana had a GNI per capita of 7,470 US dollars and a GDP 
of 17,327 million US dollars (The World Bank, 2013a). Mining contributed 
with 30.2 per cent to GDP in 2011, constituting the largest economic sector. 
Still, this might be sign of a declining importance of the sector, because the 
long-term trend has been a contribution of 40 per cent to GDP. Agriculture is a 
small contributor to the economy, accounting for two per cent. The 
manufacturing sector, which includes beef export, contributed to 12.6 per cent 
of GDP in 2011 (Bank of Botswana, 2012).  
Botswana has been regarded as a stable and fair democracy since independence 
in 1966 and is described as the longest running democracy in Africa (Country 
Watch, 2013). The general elections are considered to be open and fair. 
Economic surpluses have been well-managed by the authorities to the benefit of 
the population (The World Bank, 2013c). Botswana scores quite well on 
corruption measures. According to Transparency International, Botswana holds 
a score of 65 on the index of perceived corruption in the public sector, where 0 
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indicates very corrupt and a score of 100 indicates a very clean sector. In 
comparison, Norway scores 85 on this index. Thus, Botswana was the 30th least 
corrupt country in 2012 out of 174 countries (Transparency International, 
2012a).  
Despite economic growth and good governance, Botswana faces huge 
challenges of poverty and inequality (The World Bank, 2013c). The disparities 
of income are substantial, and the income distribution is one the world’s most 
unequal. The latest measure of income inequality in Botswana stems from 
1994, when the GINI index was measured to be 0.61 (IMF, 2012). Estimates 
from 2002 also showed a skewed distribution of income, where the 20 richest 
per cent of the population held about 70 per cent of total income. The poorest 
40 per cent of the population only held 11 per cent of total income. Poverty is 
most prevalent in rural areas, although it is growing in urban areas (UNICEF, 
2012). The number of people living below the poverty line has declined in 
recent decades, but many are still poor. Currently, 21% of the population has 
incomes below the national poverty line. Furthermore, the Botswana population 
is the world’s second most infected by HIV/AIDS (The World Bank, 2013c). 
Life expectancy at birth was measured to 53 years in 2011 (The World Bank, 
2013a). This affects the people’s welfare, and Botswana scored 0.634 on the 
Human Development Index (HDI) in 2012. This score ranks Botswana as 119 
out of 187 countries when it comes to the level of human development (UNDP, 
2013a).  
Unemployment is another major challenge for Botswana and its 2 million 
inhabitants. The official unemployment rate was 17.8 per cent in 2009 
(Botswana CSO, 2013a). Unemployment is especially high among the young. 
For people aged 20 to 24, the unemployment rate was 34 per cent (UNICEF, 
2012) and many young people work in the informal sector (Botswana CSO, 
2008). The mining and diamond sector accounts for about five per cent of 
formal jobs in Botswana. Compared to economic importance, the mining and 
the diamond industry thus generates few jobs (US Commercial Service, 2012). 
Further, the sector is quite vulnerable to external shocks and price fluctuations. 
The diamond industry is forecast to decline the next decades due to decreasing 
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diamond deposits. For future job creation, the Botswana government underlines 
the importance of diversifying the economy, and basing future economic 
growth increasingly on other sectors (The World Bank, 2013c).  
3.2.2 Agriculture 
The last 50 years, the economic importance of the agricultural sector in 
Botswana has declined. In 1966, agricultural production contributed to 40 per 
cent of GDP (Botswana CSO, 2012). As mentioned, this had diminished to two 
per cent by 2011. Still, the agricultural sector plays a vital role for a huge part 
of the Botswana population. Among people living in rural areas, a majority of 
employees have agricultural-related jobs. 30 per cent of the total employed 
population worked in the agricultural sector in 2005 (Botswana CSO, 2008). 
Further, the agricultural sector is an increasingly important job generator 
despite being a small contributor to GDP. A substantial part of the population 
bases their livelihood on incomes from the agricultural sector and in 2003 this 
applied for approximately 70 per cent (Marumo & Monkhel, 2009). Reviews of 
the agricultural sector estimates that 80 per cent of its output stems from 
livestock holdings. Among livestock herders, cattle are most usual. Other 
agricultural activities, like crop production and fisheries, only yield limited 
revenues (Botswana College of Agriculture Consult, 2008). Livestock holdings, 
especially cattle, are thus very important for the rural economy in Botswana. 
The Botswana government believes that increased agricultural productivity 
could contribute to creation of jobs in the future (Bedia, 2007). 
3.3 Namibia’s development 
3.3.1 History, economy and politics 
Namibia became an independent country in 1990 (The World Bank, 2013d). 
Before 1990, South Africa had controlled Namibia for almost 75 years (The 
Economist, 2011). After 1990, Namibia had good conditions for economic 
growth. A good physical infrastructure, abundant natural resources and a 
developed market economy were important factors in their development 
process (The World Bank, 2013d). Namibia has thus after 1990 experienced 
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political and economic success (The Economist, 2011), and is today classified 
as an upper-middle income country. The GDP of 2011 was approximately 12.5 
billion US dollars, and GNI per capita was 4,700 US dollars (The World Bank, 
2013b). 
The most important growth sectors in Namibia are mining, tourism, fisheries, 
livestock and meat production. However, these are quite vulnerable. For 
instance, ecological shocks like flooding and droughts are quite common in 
Namibia. External shocks such as cyclical, seasonal or unpredictable foreign 
demand might also create economic distortions. Namibian employment, income 
and government revenue are also indirectly affected by these shocks. 
Furthermore, the Namibian economy and the South African economy have 
strong relations. South Africa is an important trading partner, a source for 
foreign investment and the countries share common monetary policies (The 
World Bank, 2013d). 
Namibia has, since independence, developed «sound economic management, 
good governance, basic civic freedoms and respect for human rights» (The 
World Bank, 2013d). Namibia has a score of 48 on the index of perceived 
corruption in the public sector. The score implies a higher prevalence of 
corruption in Namibia compared to Botswana (Transparency International, 
2012b). On HDI, Namibia scores 0.608, which is quite similar to Botswana’s 
low score (UNDP, 2013b). However, the population in Namibia has benefited 
from increased access to basic welfare services. Examples are clean drinking 
water, schooling and health care (The World Bank, 2013d). 
Although Namibia has experienced economic success and good governance, the 
country is claimed by the UNDP to be “(...) the world’s most unequal nation” 
(The Economist, 2011), and their society is by the World Bank characterized as 
dualistic. Namibia has thus large social and economic differences (The World 
Bank, 2013d), including «one of the most unequal income distributions in the 
world» (UNDP, 2013c). Namibia had an estimated Gini-coefficient of 0.5971 in 
2009, and among individuals in Namibia, almost a quarter lives in poverty. The 
government is also facing challenges concerning new HIV infections, 
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tuberculosis incidences and malnutrition of children (The World Bank, 2013d). 
Life expectancy at birth is 62 years (The World Bank, 2013b). 
Another challenge for the economy is the high unemployment rate, and the 
percentage of people outside the labor force. The total population in Namibia is 
accounted to be approximately 2.1 million people. 63 per cent are adults (age 
15 or higher) and among these approximately 31 per cent are outside the labor 
force. The labor force participation rate for adults is 66 per cent, with a major 
difference between rural and urban areas. Labor force participation is lower in 
rural (59.9 per cent), than in urban (71.5 per cent) areas. The unemployment 
rate among economically active adults in Namibia is calculated to be 27.4 per 
cent (The Namibia Statistics Agency, 2012). 
3.3.2 Agriculture 
Agriculture is a vital sector in Namibia, even though the GDP share of 
agriculture and forestry11 was estimated to be only 4.4 per cent in 2012. 27.4 
per cent of employed Namibians are employed in the agriculture, forestry and 
fishing sector. This sector has the largest number of employees; 172,530 people 
in 2012. Many agricultural workers have low incomes compared to workers in 
other sectors (The Namibia Statistics Agency, 2012). Almost 70 per cent of 
Namibia’s population is directly dependent on income from the agricultural 
sector (Meatco, 2012). However, few of the small-scale farmers in Namibia 
deliver cattle for beef export. Mostly big commercial farms deliver cattle to 
exporting abattoirs, and about 80 per cent of these farms are owned by white 
farmers (Speed, 2012).   
 
 
                                                 
11 Agriculture and forestry include livestock farming and crop farming and forestry, and fishing 
is excluded (The Namibia Statistics Agency, 2012). 
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3.4 Beef export 
Both Botswana and Namibia have a long tradition and history of beef export. In 
addition to being able to export a certain amount duty-free to Norway since 
1995, the two countries have also been granted preferential beef export to the 
EU since 1975 (Kandenge, 2012). In 2000, preferential export to the EU was 
authorized through the Cotonou agreement, which secured Botswana and 
Namibia annual quotas for beef export of respectively 19,000 and 13,000 tons. 
Export under these quotas was granted large tariff reductions, making the EU 
export lucrative (Goodisman, et al., 2005). However, neither Botswana nor 
Namibia has ever been able to fulfill their annual EU beef quota (ODI, 2007). 
Since the Cotonou agreement is not compliant with WTO rules, the EU decided 
to replace the agreement with bilateral FTAs known as Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) (Kandenge, 2012). Both Botswana and Namibia were 
skeptical about the EPAs. Although the new agreements secured them full duty-
free and quota-free market access to the EU for all goods, the agreements also 
required that Botswana and Namibia liberalized most of their EU import in 
return. Along with some other Southern African countries, Botswana signed an 
interim EPA in 2009 (European Commission, 2011). Namibia has currently not 
signed an interim EPA, but is still covered by one. Hence, Botswana and 
Namibia currently enjoy duty-free and quota-free export of beef to the EU 
(European Commission, 2013).  
Figure 9 illustrates Botswana and Namibia’s total export of bovine meat since 
1961. Measured in quantity, both countries have increased their export since 
1961. However, this data does not provide any clear evidence that preferential 
trade agreements have led to a steady and stable export growth. Botswana and 
Namibia are small beef exporters compared to other countries (figure 10). 
Major beef producers, like Brazil, Argentina and France export much more beef 
than Botswana and Namibia, and are thus able to set the world market price that 
Botswana and Namibia have to follow (figure 11). Adjusted for inflation, the 
downward price trend has made beef relatively cheaper since 1961, and 
Botswana and Namibian exporters have followed this trend.  
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Figure 9: Total Botswana and Namibian export of bovine meat (1961 to 2010).  
Note: The figure exhibits total export of bovine meat from Botswana and Namibia from 1961 to 
2010. The export is measured in tons. Source: (Faostat, 2013).   
 
Figure 10: Export of bovine meat for selected countries (1961-2010). 
 
Note: The figure exhibits export of bovine meat from selected countries from 1961 to 2010. 
The export is measured in tons. Source: (Faostat, 2013). 
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Figure 11: Export price per kilo of bovine meat for selected countries (1961-2010). 
 
Note: The figure exhibits price per kilo for exports of bovine meat from selected countries from 
1961 to 2010. The price is measured in US dollars per kilo and adjusted for inflation.12 Source: 
(Faostat, 2013) and (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).   
3.5 Beef sector productivity 
Based on their total beef export since 1961, neither Botswana nor Namibia 
seems to have increased their productivity significantly. There might be several 
reasons for this. Botswana’s Department of Environmental Affairs argues that 
the productivity of the Botswana beef sector has declined in recent decades 
because of an apparently stagnating livestock sector. The livestock sector has 
not been able to attract investment and develop effective economies of scale. 
Further, the sector is heavily subsidised by the government, which might have 
led to livestock production in some areas where for example tourism would 
have yielded higher revenues (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2007). 
BMC, the only beef exporter in Botswana, operates several abattoirs, and about 
                                                 
12 The value has been adjusted for inflation by multiplying the nominal value in dollars by the 
purchasing power one dollar in one particular year would have had in 2010.   
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80 per cent of their beef is produced for export. Out of this, 55 per cent has 
usually been destined for the EU market. As mentioned, Botswana has never 
been able to fill its former EU quota of 19,000 tons annually. This is despite the 
fact that they clearly could have exported more to this market and have had an 
excess capacity at their abattoirs (Rich & Perry, 2010). 
 
An article by Chiriboga, et al. (2008) reviews the main reasons why the 
Namibian beef sector has not increased its productivity and international 
competitiveness. Namibia has a climate and geography ideal for cattle holding 
and beef production. However, the sector is vulnerable to floods and climate 
fluctuations. Namibia also imports large quantities of foodstuffs from South 
Africa. To import foodstuffs from South Africa is expensive, and this has 
increased the costs of cattle holding and beef production. In recent years, there 
has been a decline in slaughter animals in Namibia because of increasing export 
of young livestock. Young livestock requires less fodder, and it is thus more 
expensive to raise mature cattle. This has led to an underutilization of Namibian 
abattoirs (Chiriboga, et al., 2008). In addition, the Namibian Meat Board spends 
millions of Namibian dollars each year subsidizing abattoirs and Namibian 
cattle farmers (Rich & Perry, 2010).  
 
In addition to having production challenges, Botswana and Namibia are not 
competitive on the global beef market. Competing South American beef 
producers, like Brazil, manage to export large quantities of beef to Europe to 
competing prices, despite high tariffs. Botswana and Namibian exporters cannot 
globally compete on price (Rich & Perry, 2010). This was also expressed by 
one Norwegian beef importer, who argued that Botswana and Namibia would 
not have been able to export beef to Europe if they did not enjoy duty-free 
export quotas. If current world prices continue to decline, Botswana and 
Namibia would probably struggle (Norsk Polar, 2013a). 
 
The EU and Norway have traditionally offered prices to Botswana and Namibia 
considerably higher than the world market. As mentioned, the common SPS 
rules and standard requirements are very strict, and European consumers are 
becoming increasingly quality-oriented. To continue a profitable beef export to 
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the EU and Norway, it is argued that Botswana and Namibia must to a larger 
extent target “luxury” markets in Europe and produce more high-quality beef. 
Namibia seems to have taken this into consideration, increasingly focusing on 
meeting standards higher than EU’s minimum requirements. Especially one 
Namibian beef exporter, Meatco, has made efforts to supply high quality niche 
markets. The brand Nature’s Reserves was launched in 2008 and offers high 
quality beef. Sale of higher priced beef has also benefited Meatco’s cattle 
supplying farmers through price increases. Meatco’s products are in addition 
increasingly obtaining value from export to other markets like South-Africa and 
Norway (Agritrade, 2010). The Norwegian beef importer Norsk Polar argues 
that it is possible to market Nature’s Reserves as a high-quality beef brand in 
Norway. Further, Norsk Polar underlines that this is the only way to make 
Meatco competitive in the future, as the company cannot compete on price 
(Norsk Polar, 2013a). An indication of such a strategy can be found in chapter 
1, where figure 7 and 8 stated that Norwegian importers have paid more for 
steaks and fillets in recent years compared to earlier years. This increase could 
also be driven by recent changes in the world market price (recall figure 11). 
BMC, however still seems to focus more on quantity rather than quality. In 
addition, the co-operative has in recent years reduced marketing of its products 
in Europe. Recent outbreaks of FMD have also been a hindrance to the 
development of the Botswana’s beef sector’s competitiveness (Rich, et al., 
2012).  
3.6 Beef trade and development objectives 
Norwegian preferential beef import from Botswana and Namibia has been in 
place since 1995. It is difficult, or almost impossible, to measure what the 
particular social and economic effects of this trade have been. Also, it is hard to 
determine what the consequences might be if the trade would cease to exist. 
However, what we do know are the Norwegian objectives for this trade and the 
economic situation in Botswana and Namibia. We also know that agriculture is 
an important part of their economies and that they place great value on the beef 
trade with Norway.  
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Norwegian official development aid was initiated by the Norwegian Parliament 
in 1952, and has expanded continuously ever since. The government prioritizes 
development, and in 2012 Norwegian official aid amounted to 27 billion NOK 
(Norad, 2013). This accounted for 1.05 per cent of Norwegian GDP in 2012 
(Statistics Norway, 2013a). A number that is quite large compared to the 
ODA/GNI target (OECD target), which is 0.7 per cent of a country’s income 
(OECD DAC, 2013b). For a majority of OECD countries, this target is never 
reached, and in 2010 the accomplished average was calculated to be 0.32 per 
cent (OECD DAC, 2010).  
The main objectives of the Norwegian aid policy are to strengthen the position 
of the world’s poor and to obtain sustainable development (Norad, 2011). 
Norwegian authorities believe economic growth is crucial in order to fight 
poverty and obtain sustainable economic development. They argue that 
“industrial and economic development will be sustainable if produced goods 
and services can be sold with a satisfactory profit” (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007, p.9).13 Hence, if developing countries get access to the 
Norwegian market, this can contribute to economic growth. This is because it is 
possible to sell products profitably in Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2007). A vital part of the Norwegian strategy for helping developing 
countries to export more is to grant them preferential trade treatment.  
Trade can be beneficial for developing countries, and not only because it 
generates more income. Trade can also contribute to better productivity in 
economic sectors and generate more employment opportunities (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Rich, et al. (2012) argue that it is vital to 
sustain beef production in Botswana and Namibia because of its role as income 
generator (Rich, et al., 2012).  
Despite being upper-middle income countries, Botswana and Namibia face 
poverty, inequality and unemployment challenges. Their development needs 
thus seem to match several of the Norwegian objectives for the beef trade. We 
                                                 
13 The quote is directly translated from Norwegian to English.  
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also know that the governments in Botswana and Namibia place great value on 
the beef trade with Norway. As mentioned, in negotiations of the EFTA SACU 
FTA, the Botswana and Namibian governments have put great emphasis on 
their quotas of beef export to Norway. This indicates that both countries value 
the Norwegian preferential trade treatment and regard it as an important 
contributor to their economies, and continued trade might be justifiable. 
However, it is unclear whether much of the revenues from the Norwegian trade 
directly benefit the poorest people. In addition, the question of whether the 
Norwegian beef import has contributed to enhanced productivity remains. Both 
Botswana and Namibia have struggled to increase the productivity of their beef 
sectors, though Meatco seems to have taken a more innovative approach in 
recent years, improving its competitiveness in high-priced markets. 
The Norwegian export has contributed to development of the Namibian beef 
export sector by the establishment of the company Witvlei Meat. Before 
Witvlei was established, Meatco was the only certified beef exporter in 
Namibia. Witvlei was established in 2006, and was able to export beef to 
Europe in 2007. This was partly made possible through the aid of Norwegian 
investors in the company, which helped Witvlei to enhance it production 
capacity and quality by meeting SPS requirements (Fatland, 2013). In addition, 
Witvlei imported a tracking system from Norway, which enabled Norwegian 
importers to access information on current available products (Weidlich, 2007). 
The preferential trade has such contributed to technology transfer to a 
developing country.   
It is important to be aware that the preferential beef trade might not only 
generate positive development effects. When Botswana and Namibia 
concentrate on filling lucrative quotas to Norway, this could limit the potential 
markets that they alternatively could be competitive in and even make them 
dependent on the Norwegian trade (Melchior, et al., 2012a). One of the 
Norwegian objectives of the beef trade with Botswana and Namibia is to 
contribute to sustainable economic growth in both countries. It is important to 
keep in mind that the beef export to Norway is based on political decisions and 
regulations, not on an open and free market economy. Political motives and 
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decisions might change, which may alter the market access. If Botswana and 
Namibia prioritize to focus on exports based on products and markets that 
would not be profitable without preferential trade treatment, then this could 
diminish their competitive advantages in the future. This would be especially 
prominent if the value of Botswana and Namibia’s preferences decrease 
because other countries receive similar treatment (so-called preference-erosion) 
(Melchior, 2007). A study conducted by Grynberg & Silva (2004) argues that 
Botswana and Namibia would suffer large income losses if they experienced 
preference erosion (Grynberg & Silva, 2004). The consequences of potential 
preference erosion are important to keep in mind when evaluating the 
developmental effects of the beef trade with Botswana and Namibia. A worst 
case scenario is that the countries’ dependence on an unsustainable beef sector 
could become a hindrance for sound economic growth in the future. 
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Chapter 4 
Trade mechanisms 
Authorities can use different allocation methods when deciding which firms 
should be eligible to import under a specific quota-scheme. The method that is 
applied can have severe implications for which of the stakeholders that benefit 
from the trade. The GSP and EFTA/SACU quotas are allocated through two 
different quota-administration methods in Norway, as well as allocated through 
a firm-specific method in Botswana and Namibia.   
4.1 Quota rent and allocation 
4.1.1 Tariff-rate quota (TRQ)  
A quota is defined as a direct government restriction on the quantity of a certain 
good or product to be imported (Krugman, et al., 2011). In general, a quota is a 
policy instrument used with the same objective as a tariff, to keep domestic 
firms more profitable than they would have been with free-trade agreements, 
and thus keep domestic price above world price (Sunnevåg, 1999). After the 
Uruguay Round14, TRQs became more normal and have since developed as an 
important trade policy instrument (Mönnich, 2003). A TRQ is quite similar to a 
regular quota and is defined as a “two-level tariff, charging one tariff on a 
limited volume of imports and a second, higher tariff on all additional imports” 
(Skully 2001, p. 1). 
 A TRQ has a quantitative restriction like a regular quota. However, imports 
beyond this restriction are charged with a duty. Norway is one of the world’s 
most frequent users of TRQs (Melchior, 2005b). For instance, the Norwegian 
government has posed a restriction on the import quantity of beef, and different 
                                                 
14 “(..) the Agreement on Agriculture in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round 1994 established 
1,371 tariff quotas alone” (Hranaiova, et. al. 2003, p. 1).  
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TRQs organize the import (Melchior, et al., 2012b). Regarding the trade with 
Botswana and Namibia, 3,200 tons under the GSP quota and the EFTA/SACU 
quota combined, can be imported duty-free annually. The first charged tariff 
(in-quota tariff) is thus equal to zero. For all additional beef import applies a 
tariff (over-quota tariff). 
4.1.2 Quota rent 
A government will typically obtain tariff revenues when a tariff is implemented, 
but this is not the case with a duty-free quota. However, there exists a profit 
called quota rent (Van Assche, 2004). Quota rent is defined as; “the difference 
between the domestic demand price and the world price times the quota 
quantity (…)” (Markussen, 2008). This rent is argued to exist “because 
quantitative restrictions drive a wedge between supply and demand prices” 
(Hornig, et al., 1990). Several factors can determine the size of the quota rent 
(Hornig, et al., 1990), but “the size of the price difference depends primarily on 
the extent of scarcity created by the quota in the domestic market” (Sunnevåg 
2001, p. 17).  
The quota rent creates a situation that is typical for incidents of commodity 
arbitrage (Takacs, 1987), and firms will often use resources to get a hold of the 
rents (Hranaiova, et al., 2003). Hence, the government will not receive this 
profit automatically as with tariff revenues. Theoretically, there are mainly four 
stakeholders who can receive the quota rent: 1) Foreign exporters, 2) Domestic 
importers, 3) Domestic government and 4) Foreign government (Van Assche, 
2004). The division of the quota rent depends mainly on which allocation 
method the government decides to follow. Scholars also argue that the 
distribution of the quota rent depends on the market situation (Sunnevåg, 1999) 
and firms’ bargaining power (Boughner, et al., 2000). Firm’s bargaining power 
depends again on who receives the import license (Ingco & Nash, 2004). The 
specific allocation method used by the government also has implications for the 
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volume and distribution of the trade (Skully, 2001).15 These are implications 
that government or authorities needs to consider when choosing a specific 
allocation method.  
4.1.3 Allocation methods   
Because of import restrictions and existing quota rent, import licences become 
scarce goods (Sunnevåg, 2001). Market forces cannot structure supply and 
demand under a quota-scheme, and therefore rationing or allocation is 
necessary (Mönnich, 2003). The authorities of an importing country need to 
decide which allocation method to use and thus which firms should be eligible 
to receive the import license. This administrative allocation can be defined as 
quota-administration (Ingco & Nash, 2004), and there exists several different 
methods for allocating (Skully, 2001).16  
These administrative allocation methods are classified as either: 1) 
discretionary procedures or 2) non-discretionary procedures. Discretionary 
procedures include allocation methods based on historical share and methods 
where the import is administered by state trading enterprises or producer 
groups. The non-discretionary procedures involve allocation methods like 1) 
first-come, first-served (FCFS) basis, 2) auctions and 3) licensing on demand 
(Suprenant & Gervais, 2002). There is also another method, defined as a 
country-specific allocation (Mönnich, 2003).17 For simplicity, we will only give 
a theoretical review of quota allocation based on historical share, FCFS, auction 
and country-specific allocation.  
 
                                                 
15 Questions regarding how quota allocation can have implication for the volume and 
distribution of trade is not the main topic of this thesis. See Skully (2001) for a discussion.  
16 The WTO has defined seven allocation methods (Hranaiova, et al., 2003). See Ingco & Nash 
(2004) for a more detailed description of these. 
17 This method is similar to what is known as a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) (Pugel, 
2007). 
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Some governments allow reselling of quota licenses in a secondary-market. It 
should therefore be mentioned that some scholars argue that the choice of 
allocation method matter less if licenses are allowed to be sold in a perfect 
competitive secondary-market. Hence, the firms wanting these licenses most, 
would through such an operating market get them anyway and would thus 
secure an efficient allocation (Afualo & Mcmillan, 1996). An efficient 
secondary-market corrects any inefficiency the initial allocation method may 
have. This argument builds on the famous ‘Coase-theorem’, which implies that 
as “(…) long as the allocation remains inefficient, the parties will continually 
find in their interest to buy, sell, and swap as necessary to eliminate the 
inefficiency” (Milgrom 2004, p. 21). This argument is also valid for the choice 
of auction design, discussed later. However, the argument has faced criticism 
based on observations in real world examples (Milgrom, 2004). Milgrom 
(2004) argues that “(…) there exist no mechanism that will reliably untangle an 
initial misallocation” (Milgrom 2004, p. 21).  
The costs of quota administration are also worth mentioning. The direct 
administration costs are attributable to the taxpayers, but Mönnich (2003) also 
argues that firms face several transaction costs connected to the administration. 
First of all, in being able to receive an import license, the importers or exporters 
need to fulfill certain requirements. Second, the firms might need to use 
resources in the application process, such as time consuming paper work or 
online applications. For importers or exporters, there might also be a hedging 
cost connected with the possibility of not receiving import license or being able 
to export. Firms might also face costs when the quota period is near the end and 
they need to speed up the importing or exporting process. For importers, finding 
relevant business partners in exporting countries might be costly (Mönnich, 
2003).  
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4.2 Discretionary procedures 
A discretionary procedure is defined as an allocation method where the 
government assigns import rights to a limited number of importing firms (or 
importers). The method is characterized by the government having literally no 
costs connected to the allocation process. With other words, there are only 
small resource expenses for the government, compared with other 
administration methods. Furthermore, the government only needs to assign 
licenses to firms based on particular criteria, and therefore no form of 
competition, applications or negotiations take place (Pugel, 2007). Firms have 
thus no direct transaction costs connected to this allocation and will gain so-
called “windfall profits”.18 The most common discretionary method is 
allocation based on historical shares. Historical share allocation is typically 
based on firms’ market share in a given period (Skully, 2001). Hence, importers 
who were in the game before the quota was implemented, usually have a clear 
advantage (Mönnich, 2003).  
An example of quota administration based on historical share can be found in 
an article by Suprenant & Gervais (2002). These scholars investigated the 
supply sides’ (Canadian chicken importers’) preferences towards different 
allocation methods, where a total of 497 importers participated in a 
questionnaire. The import licenses for chicken in Canada were allocated 
through mixed allocation methods. Some of these licenses were allocated to 
farmers based on their historical import share before quota implementation, 
while others have been allocated on the basis of domestic market share. A 
majority of the importers expressed in the surveys that the existing quota 
administration was most preferable, and the firms were satisfied with the 
arrangement (Suprenant & Gervais, 2002). An interesting result was that almost 
50 per cent of the importers expressed that “the current system did not facilitate 
entry by new importing firms into the market for import licenses” (Suprenant & 
                                                 
18 Windfall gains” is defined as profits gained by firms with zero effort or cost (Sunnevåg, 
1999).  
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Gervais 2002, p. 69). They also argue that a main advantage of allocation based 
on historical share for importers is that since these firms have already been 
given an import license, they have the possibility to coordinate their import 
activities accordingly to their market needs (Suprenant & Gervais, 2002).  
4.3 Non-discretionary procedures 
Allocation based on the FCFS basis is a common non-discretionary procedure 
applied by governments (Hranaiova, et al., 2003). The economic literature of 
the FCFS basis is found in the ‘waiting-in-line’ literature, such as Holt & 
Sherman (1981). According to them, “(…) if commodities are distributed to 
consumers on a first-come-first-served basis, a high bid corresponds to arriving 
early and being first in line” (Holt & Sherman 1981, p. 1). They compare an 
individual’s or a firm’s arriving time with a bid in a ‘sealed auction’ (closed), 
and whether the arrival time is a winning bid or not, depends on the actions of 
competitors. With an early arrival, comparable to a higher bidding behavior, the 
individuals or firms would increase their chances of obtaining the license or 
object (Holt & Sherman, 1981). Clearly, a late arrival time has an expense, 
since as Takacs (1987) puts it; “(...) whoever is able to bring the goods into the 
country first (…) would probably receive the windfall gains, or ‘quota rents’” 
(Takacs 1987, p. 2). Despite the loss of windfall profits, the expenses can be 
even higher if there is no existing information from authorities on how much of 
the quota is utilized. A filled quota jeopardizes the profitability of a firm’s 
import, because excess import will be charged with a tariff. If the firm does not 
want to import under this tariff, it has to find a way to store or dispose the 
imported goods or sell them with a lower profit in another market (Mönnich, 
2003). 
According to Suprenant & Gervais (2002), the FCFS basis creates a “race to the 
border”, unless there are some obstacles created by bureaucracy. They further 
argue that this allocation method is beneficial for importers with low import-
related transaction costs. These importers might have lower costs because they 
are either closer to the border compared with competitors, or due to better 
marketing channels with trading partners (Suprenant & Gervais, 2002). Firms 
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having a late arrival time, might adjust to next year’s “race to the border” by 
investing in faster transportation modes or in better storing facilities (Mönnich, 
2003). Governments, on the other hand, might find the FCFS basis to be a quick 
and efficient process, with small administration costs. 
4.3.1 The GSP quota (FCFS)  
The Norwegian allocation of the GSP quota is an example of the FCFS basis. 
The NC has administered the quota since its implementation in 1995. The quota 
is accessible for all Norwegian importing firms and importers. The NC 
considered distributing the quota on historical shares of import, but chose the 
FCFS basis. This basis was considered to be the most fair, and NC argued that 
it gave equal opportunities for all participants (NC, 2013c).   
The quota opens on 1 January, and the quantity of 2,700 tons must be used 
within the year. If not entirely used one year, it is not possible to transfer the 
excess quantity to the next year. There are no restrictions of how much of the 
quantity one importer can take, and it is thus technically feasible for one 
importer to capture the whole quota. Several factors complicate this scenario, 
for instance the planning of seasonal demand, and this situation has therefore 
never occurred. In addition, there is no secondary-market for the import 
licenses under this quota-scheme. Usually there are six to seven of the same 
firms that import under the quota, which is typically full around September 
each year. Importers can easily contact the NC, and check how much of the 
quota is left. However, the NC cannot reveal any information about other 
importers and their share of the quota. For beef to be declared under the quota, 
it is required that it has arrived Norway (NC, 2013c). So there is a risk of 
having to import under the over-quota tariff or disposing the beef, but the 
importers can easily avoid this by checking the status at the NC.  
The only direct transaction expense for a firm connected to the import process 
is the declaration. For importers who know the routines of declaration, the costs 
are considered to be low. The declaration to the NC only takes a few minutes if 
all the right documents are presented. If any further control is needed the NC 
will notify the importer within 15 minutes. According to the NC, neither they 
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nor the Norwegian government earns anything from the import process. The 
quota rent is either shared between or fully taken by the exporter or the importer 
(NC, 2013c).  
4.3.2 Auctions  
Auction is another allocation method, and is defined as a market-based 
procedure (Sunnevåg, 1999). Hence, the method uses market forces to 
distribute import or export licenses (Markussen, 2008). Takacs (1987) argues 
that there are two main arguments for using auction: 1) Government revenue 
and 2) increased transparency (Takacs, 1987). 
The first argument for auction implies that authorities use it as a tool to draw 
most of the quota rent into governments’ ‘state treasury’, and thus prevent 
‘windfall gains’ for importing firms (Sunnevåg, 1999). In a competitive 
environment, firms will bid against each other and the highest bid will equal the 
quota rent. Similar to tariff revenues, the domestic government will collect the 
highest bid as revenue (Markussen, 2008). The quota rent collected by the 
domestic government, can thus become a common good used to what is best for 
society (taxpayers) and not what is best for importers. For instance, the 
domestic government has the opportunity to set aside quota rent for specific 
development purposes, for example restructuring of an uncompetitive domestic 
sector (Sunnevåg, 1999). But as Takacs (1987) argues, governments are not 
“secured” a share of the quota rent by choosing auction as allocation. Market 
power in the domestic and foreign countries and the design of the auction 
format also has a say. Perfect competition along the whole value chain in these 
two markets might increase the chances of transferring the whole quota rent to 
governments under auctions (Takacs, 1987). This would however not be 
prevalent if only one importer has the potential to bid. Since there is no 
competition in the bidding process, he can bid minimal for a quota share and 
thus receive the quota rent. A single exporter (or an export monopoly), on the 
other hand, can easily pressure the world price upward to a point where there is 
almost no quota rents left. Importers will then bid minimal, and governments 
will thus not get a share of the quota rents (Takacs, 1987). 
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What Takacs (1987) implies with the second argument of increased 
transparency, is that auctions can reveal information about the level of 
protection (Takacs, 1987). If domestic importers bid less than anticipated 
market value for the quota, this might imply that the quota rent is small and 
trade less profitable. This might again indicate that any constraint on trade 
should be removed. Furthermore, an auction is also argued to have an 
information advantage and can thus give valuable information about the 
expected value of the quota rent (Sunnevåg, 1999). 
There are also arguments against using an auction as a distribution format. 
Some argue that an auction creates a more restrictive and a more expensive 
trade than intended. The reason is that the process will more or less force the 
importers to bid, and ‘panic bidding’ might occur. This is the case when 
importers bid with an objective of staying in the business or with a desperate 
need of quota share. Such bidding behavior can overestimate the value of the 
quota rents. Underestimation might occur if there is market power at the 
demand side. As mentioned, market power can create a minimal bidding 
behavior (Takacs, 1987). 
Another argument against auctions presented in the literature is that they are 
often viewed upon as a “bureaucratic nightmare” (Takacs, 1987), and are 
argued to be less politically preferred (Afualo & Mcmillan, 1996). The format 
can for instance disturb trading relationships. There is also an argument that 
says that auctions might disturb market concentration, allowing strong 
monopolies to foster and squeeze out small firms. Strong firms are able to pay a 
higher bidding price than small firms, and a single firm can thus capture the 
whole quota (Takacs, 1987). 
Sunnevåg (1999) poses another argument against auction as an allocation 
method. He argues that importers may have a development objective for trade, 
and thus want to pay domestic price to the exporter. An auction can prevent 
this, as some of the revenue accrues the authorities. With the FCFS-method, 
importers may pay full domestic price to the exporters (Sunnevåg, 1999).  
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4.3.3 Auction formats 
Governments want to maximize the quota rent collected, and this is often the 
objective when the authorities choose an auction design (Sunnevåg, 1999). 
Furthermore, Takacs (1987) argues that authorities should choose an auction 
format that secures most of the auction revenue for the government. The format 
should also give bidders the possibility to reveal the expected value of the quota 
rent (Takacs, 1987).  
The most known auction designs are 1) the ascending-bid auction (English 
auction), 2) the descending-bid auction (Dutch auction)19, 3) the first-price 
sealed-bid auction and 4) the second-price sealed-bid auction (“Vickrey 
auction”) (Klemperer, 2004). The ‘English auction’ is the most well-known 
auction format, and is often used in art and wine auctions, where bidders can 
adjust their price up according to the highest bid presented. This format 
typically auctions off one object, a famous painting etc., and the winner of the 
auction is the individual or firm with the highest bid. The auction closes when 
there are no counter bids to the highest bid (Sunnevåg, 1999). The ‘English 
auction’ is thus defined as an ascending (open) auction, since the bidders can 
see or hear each other’s bids (Loertscher & Wilkening, 2011). The main 
advantage of an ascending auction format is the information mechanism. It 
reveals the competitors’ bids and thus the value of the object or import license. 
Firms are able to adjust their bidding behavior, and the mechanisms will most 
likely secure that the auctioned object will go to the bidder who cherishes it the 
most.  
The 3) first- price sealed-bid auction and 4) the second-price sealed-bid 
auction (“Vickrey auction”) have a so-called ‘sealed-bid format’ and are thus 
defined as closed auctions. A sealed format is typically used in several different 
forms of competitive bidding (Sunnevåg, 2006). Compared to the ‘English 
                                                 
19 ‘Dutch auction’: “(…) seller announces a bid that is continuously lowered until a buyer say 
stop and buy the object at this price” (Sunnevåg 1999, p. 35). This quote is directly translated 
from Norwegian to English.   
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auction’, this type is considered to be a better auction design when auctioning 
off multiple objects instead of one. Since import licenses could be defined as 
more or less identical items, and these items typically have many potential 
buyers, the authorities often tend to pick this design (Sunnevåg, 1999).  
Since there are multiple objects, such as import licenses, the ‘sealed-bid format’ 
has typically more than one winner and is also often characterized by using a 
‘one-shot’ design. Hence, the bidding-process is arranged simultaneously and 
the bidders do not have the possibility to improve their bids or lay in 
counterbids. The simultaneous bids constitute a demand curve, and the 
government can then easily find the intersection between supply and demand 
(Sunnevåg, 2001). However, the closed auctions have an information 
disadvantage. Information about the object’s value will not be revealed, such as 
in an open auction, and it thus becomes more random who actually receives the 
object or license. Bidders might feel insecure about the perceived value, and 
guessing bids might occur (Sunnevåg, 1999).  
A ‘multiple-shot’ design would solve the information problem that a ‘single- 
shot’ design has. Firms or individuals will then receive information about 
competitors’ bidding behavior, and can then adjust their bidding accordingly. 
However, the risk of tacit collusion among bidding competitors is higher. In an 
ascending auction format, the competing bidders can agree on holding the bid 
price artificially low. This is possible to achieve in a format like this, since the 
information mechanism opens up for a punishment risk. Firms will have the 
incentive to bid a higher price than the agreed price, and capture a larger share 
of the quota. In this format, such a bidding behavior would be punished by 
bidding competitors. Another characteristic of the open ‘multiple-shot’ design 
is that the difference between the highest bid and lowest accepting bid is 
smaller compared to a closed ‘single-shot’ design (Sunnevåg, 1999). 
In the literature of auction theory there is also a discussion about seller (or 
auctioneer) revenues, and one distinguishes between the scholars who favor the 
ascending format and those who favor sealed bidding. This discussion is 
important for authorities wanting to maximize auction revenues. Scholars 
favoring the ascending bid format argument for a more exciting and 
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competitive format and believe that this environment will drive the bids close to 
the bidders’ reservation price. Those scholars who oppose this format believe 
that bidders will act more cautiously, and thus observe the bidding development 
and not bid close to their reservation price. They argue that the bidder, who 
really wants the object, will bid his or her maximum value in a sealed format 
(Milgrom, 2004).  
The sealed auction formats differ in the price the winning bidders have to pay 
and this is the main difference in the characteristics of the 3) ‘first-price sealed- 
bid auction’ and 4) ‘second-price sealed-bid auction”. In 3), the bidders bid 
independently and the winners pay a price equal to their bid. This economic 
phenomenon is known as ‘price discrimination’, where different buyers pay 
unequal price for basically the same object. The auctioneer thus acts like a 
monopolist. A ‘second-price sealed-bid auction’ is where bidders bid 
independently but the highest (or winning) bidders pay a price equal to the 
second highest bid. This pricing format is also known as a uniform-price. This 
price could either be the lowest accepted bid or the highest rejected bid, also 
known as the famous “Vickrey-principle”. In such, the uniform price functions 
as a market-clearing price in a competitive market (Sunnevåg, 1999). However, 
economists and politicians do not seem to agree on what is the best pricing-
scheme and what the implications are for auction revenues (Sunnevåg, 2006).20 
Takacs (1987), for instance, believes that sealed bidding with a uniform-price is 
an important tool in revealing the size of the quota rent. In such a situation, the 
bidders do not need to worry about the expenses of bidding high, and can thus 
reveal the true value of the license (Takacs, 1987).  
4.3.4 The EFTA/SACU quota (Auction)  
The EFTA/SACU quota is administered by the Norwegian Agricultural 
Authority (NAA). The NAA started to allocate various GSP-import licenses 
through auctions in 1996 (Sunnevåg, 1999). The authorities believed that 
                                                 
20 This issue will not be discussed further in this thesis. See Sunnevåg (1999) or Sunnevåg 
(2006) for a discussion.  
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auction was the right format, since it is an open process that provides equal 
treatment and give the same information to each participant (Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance, 2011) The auction format applied to Norwegian import 
quotas is an ascending design with a discriminatory pricing scheme (Sunnevåg, 
2001). In 2006, the bilateral agreement between Norway and SACU was 
ratified, and import licenses under the EFTA/SACU quota have been allocated 
through auctions since 2008 (NAA, 2013b).  
Importers or importing firms, who want an import license under the 
EFTA/SACU quota, must register and fulfill certain requirements set by the 
NAA. First, the firm must document that it is a registered firm in Norway and 
prove valid tax and VAT certificates. Second, the NAA attempts to avoid tacit 
collusion among firms. An importer must sign a declaration saying that the firm 
will not co-operate or make any preliminary agreements with other firms 
participating in the auction. If a firm breaks these rules, the NAA may withdraw 
an import license and ban a firm from participating in the auction for the next 
three years (NAA, 2013a). 
The whole quota for one particular year is auctioned off at the same time, 
usually in October/November of the preceding year. The auction is held online. 
When it opens, all firms registered to participate may send in their bid. They 
can bid on a certain amount (kilos) and on what price (NOK/kilo) they are 
willing to pay for this import license. After the first bidding round, the bidder 
may see the other bids, but the identity of the other bidders is not revealed. The 
auction process continues until the bidding ends. The bidders are allocated a 
part of the quota based on the price discrimination method. Hence, the 
importers have to pay their last (highest) bid for the license (NAA, 2013a). The 
different prices create a demand curve, and the auctioneer can then find the 
equilibrium between supply and demand (Sunnevåg, 2006). Since the 
implementation of this auction in 2008, the difference between the highest and 
lowest accepted bid has been small (Table 4).21 This is similar to what 
Sunnevåg (1999) suggests happens in an ascending auction format. Some of the 
                                                 
21 See Appendix B for auction reports.  
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bids also seem to be more or less symbolic sums. The bidding prices paid by 
Norwegian importers in 2008, 2009 and 2011 were quite low. For instance, the 
minimum accepted bid price in 2008 was 0.01 NOK. The revenues from the 
auction accrue the NAA and thus the Norwegian government. If the auction 
revenues actually reflect the true value of the quota rent, neither importers nor 
exporters would benefit from an auction allocation. Instead, the Norwegian 
government would obtain the whole quota rent. 
Table 4: The difference between the highest and lowest winning bids under the auction of 
the EFTA/SACU quota (2008-2013).  
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Highest winning bid 0,01 1,16 16,01 1,00 4,01 9,25 
Lowest winning bid 0,01 1,15 16,00 0,05 4,00 9,23 
Difference 0 0,01 0,01 0,95 0,01 0,02 
Note: The bids are measured in NOK per kilo. Source: (NAA, 2013b). 
Under the EFTA/SACU quota, it is possible for one importer to capture the 
whole quota and act as a monopolist. However, the NAA claims that this 
situation has never occurred. The auction reports exhibit several participants 
each year, and minimal bidding behavior should therefore not have occurred 
theoretically. The NAA issues licences to the bidders after the auction has 
ended. These are tradable in a ‘secondary-market’, which means that the first 
bidder may sell his license to the second bidder. The price is negotiated by the 
two bidders, but the transaction must be reported to the NAA, who then issues a 
new license (NAA, 2013a). However, we have not obtained any data on prices 
in the operating secondary-market.  
To illustrate some of the mechanisms of the auction process, a simple 
hypothetical example is provided. If two firms both bid 0.01 NOK per kilo for 
the whole quota of 500 tons, they will be allocated 250 tons each if the auction 
ends after the first round. If one of the bidders decide to bid 0.02 NOK per kilo 
for the whole quota in the second round, and no other bid is registered, this 
bidder will win the whole quota. Another scenario is that the first bidder bids 
0.02 NOK per kilo for 250 tons, and that two other bidders bid 0.01 per kilo for 
250 tons. Then, the first bidder will get 250 tons, and the two others will get 
125 tons each (NAA, 2013a).  
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4.4 Country-specific allocation 
Country-specific allocation is often determined by political considerations, and 
is an allocation where importing countries decide which exporting countries 
may export under the quota. Importers must then obtain both an import license 
and a matching export license. Hence, the bargaining power of the exporting 
firms is increased (Mönnich, 2003).  
4.4.1 Botswana and Namibia allocation  
The two different quota allocations in Norway, FCFS basis and auction, are not 
the only features that regulate the beef export. Since the quotas are distributed 
on a country-specific allocation, this enables the Botswana and Namibian 
governments to distribute the quotas to specific firms (table 4). First, the GSP 
quota of 2,700 tons is split equally between the two countries. This was agreed 
in negotiations between BMC and the Meat Corporation of Namibia (Meatco). 
The two countries have split the quota equally for the last 10 to 15 years, taking 
1,350 tons each (Weidlich, 2010). Second, The EFTA/SACU quota of 500 tons 
has been split likewise since it was implemented in 2008 (Sleipnes, 2012). 
Third, the Namibian quota share has in recent years been split equally between 
two eligible exporters in Namibia, Meatco and Witvlei. 
Table 5: Allocation of the Norwegian quotas in Botswana and Namibia. 
Exporting firm BMC 
(Botswana) 
Meatco 
(Namibia) 
Witvlei 
(Namibia) 
Quota share in tons  
(GSP + EFTA/SACU) 
1600 (1350 + 
250) 
800 (675 + 125) 800 (675 + 125) 
 
The equal quota split between Meatco and Witvlei has a special background, 
and started with the fact that the beef trade for several years was administered 
by a firm in London (NC, 2013c). This firm is called Allied Meat Importers 
(AMI) (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2000), and is a subsidiary of BMC 
(BMC, 2010a). The arrangements of BMC’s beef export to Europe have 
traditionally gone through AMI’s offices in the UK, Germany or the 
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Netherlands. Meatco also supplied their meat to Europe through AMI until late 
2007. This trade was characterized by historical agreements between a limited 
number of importers and exporters and thus excluded several firms (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). The reason why Meatco changed their 
supplier was because AMI did not manage to concentrate on brand promotion 
of Namibian beef as a premium product (ODI, 2007). Eventually, BMC also 
ended their relationship with AMI in 2012. BMC complained that AMI sold 
their products cheap, in low-value markets, and did a poor marketing job (The 
Patriot, 2013).   
Witvlei Meat (Witvlei), another Namibian beef producer and exporter, issued a 
complaint to the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) in 2010. The firm 
argued that a price co-operation between AMI, BMC and Meatco existed. They 
stated that AMI was able to control the beef trade and reduce competition 
(NCA, 2011). Witvlei further argued that AMI captured the GSP quota for 
2010, shortly after midnight on 1 January, limiting Witvlei’s access to the 
Norwegian market (NCA, 2010). The NCA investigated the case, but found no 
reason to proceed and closed the investigation. The Namibian Competition 
Commission (NCC) also examined the case, but concluded that Namibian 
Competition Law had not been violated (NCA, 2011). Meatco argued that 
Witvlei had not been excluded from the Norwegian market, as they had 
exported 400 tons of beef to Norway under the GSP quota (Weidlich, 2010). 
Despite the fact that none of the competition authorities agreed with Witvlei’s 
complaint, the Namibian government decided in 2010 to split the Namibian part 
of the Norwegian quota equally between Witvlei and Meatco. Both the GSP 
quota and the EFTA/SACU quota are equally split between these two exporters. 
The government wanted to prevent a “race to the border” of the GSP-quota, and 
preferred that all eligible producers should be able to export (Ndjoze, 2011). 
The government also underlined that Norwegian authorities preferred a stable 
beef import throughout the year. Meatco argued against splitting the quota 
equally, and proposed that the quota rather should be allocated to meat 
producers based on the annual number of cattle slaughtered. To illustrate, 
Meatco slaughtered 117,000 cattle and Witvlei 13,000 in 2009 (Poolman, 
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2010). If the quota had been shared using this criterion, Witvlei would only 
have obtained 10 per cent of the quota.   
The Meat Board of Namibia22 has been given the task of allocating the 
Norwegian beef quota to the two eligible exporters in Namibia. Regularly, 
Meatco and Witvlei are allocated 800 tons each on an annual basis (The Meat 
Board of Namibia, 2011b). However, since BMC has struggled with FMD, 
some of their quota shares were transferred to Namibia in 2011 and 2012. In 
2012, a total of 2,828 tons were allocated equally between Meatco and Witvlei 
(The Meat Board of Namibia, 2013a). The quota share is allocated to the other 
firm, if one exporter is unable to fill its quota share one year (Poolman, 2010). 
New entrants can apply to the Meat Board for a share of the quota, if they are 
able to meet the SPS-standards for exporting beef to Norway. Similar to an 
export certificate, firms seeking to export beef to Norway must document a 
Norwegian “approval of establishment” certificate (Ndjoze, 2011).  
                                                 
22 “The Meat Board of Namibia, founded in 1935, facilitates the export of livestock, meat and 
processed meat products to importing countries. All major stakeholders of the Namibian meat 
industry are represented on the Board” (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2011a). 
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Chapter 5 
Exporters and importers 
There are three firms in Botswana and Namibia eligible to export beef to 
Norway. One is located in Botswana, and the two others in Namibia. These 
firms differ when it comes to size, ownership structure, export markets and 
financial situation. The value of the Norwegian beef export also varies among 
the exporters. Several Norwegian firms import beef from Botswana and 
Namibia, and there are generally three types of importing firms. The 
stakeholders have different views on the various quota allocation methods.  
5.1 Exporting firms 
5.1.1 Botswana Meat Commission (BMC)  
Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), established in 1965, is the only beef 
exporter in Botswana. It is organized as a semi-state owned company (BMC, 
2010b). Their beef products are sold to both foreign and domestic retailers 
(Bedia, 2007). The objectives of the firm are to expand the domestic meat 
production and market Botswana beef internationally (BMC, 2010b). Even 
though BMC is a semi-state company, it functions as a co-operative 
organization, which is owned by farmers (Bedia, 2007). The firm’s surplus ends 
up as a bonus for the farmers at the end of each year (Sunnevåg, 1999). The 
headquarters of BMC is located in the city of Lobatse in South-Eastern 
Botswana. The co-operative owns three abattoirs in Botswana and some 
freezing facilities in South Africa. BMC also has subsidiaries in the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands and South-Africa and is a partner of an insurance 
company on Cayman Islands (BMC, 2010b).  
  
As mentioned earlier, Botswana has struggled with low productivity in the beef 
sector. Scholars argue that BMC has had economic problems since 1998/99 
(Stevens & Kennan, 2005). BMC has had budget deficits on operating costs 
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since 2009. The deficit of 2011 amounted to 166 million NOK23 and significant 
losses were also predicted for 2012. The profitability of BMC has suffered, and 
has led to government intervention. In connection with BMC’s financial 
problems in 2012, the government provided BMC loans of respectively 78 and 
154 million NOK (BMC, 2013).24  
 
The causes of BMC’s financial problems were both external and internal. The 
financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to more competitive global beef prices and 
lower demand for beef (BMC, 2010c). The financial trouble was also due to 
international exchange rate fluctuations. Internally, outbreaks of foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) amplified the downturn in the sector. Botswana was banned 
from export to Europe for a certain period in 2011 and 2012. After the ban was 
lifted, the European market again became lucrative for Botswana’s beef sector 
(BMC, 2013).  
 
Incomes from export activities are vital for BMC and the EU and South Africa 
are the most important export markets. Norway is also viewed to be an 
important and lucrative market for beef export. In 2008, BMC’s beef export to 
Norway was worth a total of 36.6 million NOK (Statistics Norway, 2013a).25 
The 2008 annual turnover amounted to 516.8 million NOK, which means that 
the Norwegian export accounted for seven per cent of total revenue (BMC, 
2009).26 
                                                 
23 This number has been estimated in NOK by using the annual average exchange rate between 
Pula and NOK in 2012 (Oanda, 2013). 
24 This number has been estimated in NOK by using the annual average exchange rate between 
Pula and NOK in 2012 (Oanda, 2013). 
25 This number has been estimated in NOK by using the annual average exchange rate between 
Pula and NOK in 2012 (Oanda, 2013). 
26 This number has been estimated in NOK by using the annual average exchange rate between 
Pula and NOK in 2012 (Oanda, 2013). 
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5.1.2 Meat Corporation of Namibia (Meatco)  
The Meat Corporation of Namibia (Meatco) is a meat producer and a certified 
beef exporter. In the early 1980s, the beef production industry in Namibia was 
near total collapse. The beef slaughter and processing industry suffered heavily 
from overcapacity and fragmentation. Meatco was established as a response to 
this situation with the objective of creating a successful export business for beef 
in Namibia (Meatco, 2012). 
Meatco is classified as a state-owned company.27 However, Meatco claims that 
the government has no financial interests in the corporation. “The Meat 
Corporation of Namibia Act 2001”28 regulates Meatco, and the corporation is 
therefore obliged to “(…) serve, promote and co-ordinate the interests of 
livestock producers in Namibia (…)” (Meatco 2012, p. 42). Meatco is thus 
organized as a co-operative, with livestock producers as members (Meatco, 
2013a). The main role of the government is thus to secure fair treatment of 
farmers. Recently, the corporation was divided into two components, where one 
is owned by the co-operative. The second is split between the co-operative and 
the government, where 70 per cent is owned by the co-operative and 30 per cent 
is owned by the government. In recent years there has been an on-going dispute 
about the ownership structure of Meatco (Poolman, 2012).  
The headquarters of Meatco is located in Windhoek, where it has its marketing 
and meat processing facilities. Meatco has various abattoirs located across 
Namibia and approximately 1,200 employees. On an annual basis, the 
corporation slaughter almost 120,000 cattle and 27,000 tons of beef is produced 
(Meatco, 2013b). Further, Meatco has several subsidiaries located 
internationally. These subsidiaries are found in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany, South Africa and Guernsey (Meatco, 2012). Meatco had 
                                                 
27 Classified through the “State-owned Enterprises Governance Act 2006” (Act 2). 
28 Act 1 of 2001. 
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a loss of 30.6 million NOK in 2011, but generated a profit of 17.5 million in 
2012 (Meatco, 2013a).29 
Meatco is the largest player in the Namibian beef export market and accounts 
for approximately 80 per cent of exports. The main export markets are South 
Africa, the United Kingdom and Norway. The corporation also has a foothold 
in other markets, like Germany, Switzerland, Italy, China and Dubai (Meatco, 
2013b). Meatco argues that they serve premium-quality beef, and that they 
concentrate on niche markets (also defined as “premium markets”) locally and 
internationally (Meatco, 2013a). 
In 2011, about 46 per cent of Meatco’s products were exported to South Africa. 
However, this volume only contributed to approximately 33 per cent of total 
sales revenues. Norway is a small but important export market for Meatco. 
During 2011, approximately five per cent of beef production was exported to 
Norway. However, these five per cent contributed to approximately 15 per cent 
of Meatco’s sales revenues (Meatco, 2013a). Meatco claims to have lost a great 
share of revenue when their access to the Norwegian duty-free export market 
became more limited. This was due to the decision to split the GSP quota and 
EFTA/SACU quota on a 50:50 basis with Witvlei (Meatco, 2012). Meatco’s 
revenues were reduced with 24.9 million NOK in 2011/2012, due to the quota 
split (Hoaës, 2012).30 
5.1.3 Witvlei Meat  
Witvlei is a small private shareholder company with 100 employees and 
capacity to slaughter 27,000 cattle per year31 (Witvlei Meat, 2010). The firm 
was established in 2006 by two local Namibian businessmen. They also got 
                                                 
29 This number has been estimated in NOK by using the annual average exchange rate between 
Namibian dollars and NOK in 2012 (Oanda, 2013). 
30 This number has been estimated in NOK by using the annual average exchange rate between 
Namibian dollars and NOK in 2012 (Oanda, 2013). 
31 We do not have information about the annual tonnage of beef produced.  
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financial help from two Norwegian counterparts; Fatland AS and Brødrene 
Michelsen AS (Gaomas, 2006). These two companies and the Norwegian 
Consul in Namibia, Klaus Endresen, each bought a 10 per cent share of Witvlei 
(Fatland, 2013).  
 
In 2009, the partnership structure changed in Witvlei. The firm was not satisfied 
with their current partnership, and the contract with Fatland and Brødrene 
Michelsen was terminated. According to the initial contract, the Norwegian 
businesses had committed themselves to sell the beef in Norway for the highest 
obtainable market price. Witvlei argued that the firms had not followed their 
commitments, and had sold beef below Norwegian market price. In 2010, they 
sued Fatland and Brødrene Michelsen (Smith, 2010). Fatland and Brødrene 
Michelsen, on the other hand, have argued that the operated prices were agreed 
with Witvlei. Import prices were also claimed to be similar to the prices offered 
by the other importers, which were organized through AMI (Fatland, 2013). 
Nortura SA (Nortura), another Norwegian meat importer, became a shareholder 
in Witvlei in 2010. The Norwegian firm bought 30 per cent of the company 
shares. For Nortura, an acquisition was the only possibility to enter a beef trade 
that had been characterised by exclusive agreements and information bias. 
Nortura felt that the exporters were not aware of the level of the Norwegian 
purchasing power (Nortura, 2013c). After Nortura’s entrance, Fatland’s and 
Brødrene Michelsen’s shares were diluted to 6.7 per cent each. Today, foreign 
stakeholders hold 70 per cent of the shares in Witvlei. Norwegian importers 
hold 43.4 per cent, while South African investors own 27.3 per cent. Namibian 
investors hold rest of the shares, with businessman Sydney Martin as the largest 
shareholder (Poolman, 2011). 
 
Up to Nortura’s entrance, Witvlei had financial trouble (Horntvedt, 2012). 
Nortura reduced the production volume, focusing on quality rather than 
quantity. Nortura also started to pay a higher import price to Witvlei. The 
Norwegian firm argues that these actions improved the profitability of the 
company (Nortura, 2013c). It is obvious that these increased import prices have 
been important, since Witvlei first of all was established with the Norwegian 
market as their main export target (Melchior, et al., 2012a). The firm also seems 
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satisfied with the entrance of Nortura. It is further argued that the increased 
import prices have enabled Witvlei to double the prices paid to the cattle 
farmers (Sunde, 2012). 
5.2 Importing firms 
There are different types of Norwegian firms who import beef from Botswana 
and Namibia. The first years after the GSP quota was implemented, meat 
traders and importers captured most of the quotas. These firms concentrate on 
food import and do not buy meat from Norwegian suppliers. They import beef 
simply to resell it in the Norwegian market (Melchior, et al., 2012a). Another 
type of firms is so-called meat processing firms. Fatland AS and Nortura are 
categorized as such firms. They import beef, but their intention is to buy most 
of their meat from Norwegian suppliers. Some of the beef import is also 
organized through Norwegian wholesalers and supermarket chains 
(Norgesgruppen, Rema Industrier etc.) (Melchior, et al., 2012a; Nortura, 
2013c). For instance, Norsk Polar is wholly-owned by Norgesgruppen (Norsk 
Polar, 2013b). 
Nortura is an important player in the Norwegian agricultural sector, and is a co-
operative owned by 18,500 farmers (Nortura, 2013d). Hence, Nortura oblige to 
work for the Norwegian farmer’s interest. Nortura has several important roles in 
the Norwegian agricultural sector. First, Nortura is assigned to be a market 
regulator for meat in Norway. Nortura also has an important role as both a 
producer and importer. The co-operative used to be sceptical to the preferential 
beef trade (Nortura, 2013c), but launched a new strategy regarding import in 
2008, and stated that they wanted to engage in the Norwegian beef trade with 
Botswana and Namibia. A part of this strategy was to pay a higher import price 
for the beef to the exporters (Melchior, et al., 2012a), and “add value to the 
African meat” (Nortura, 2013d). By a higher import price, Nortura imply prices 
that reflect the Norwegian purchasing power. Nortura also wanted to obtain a 
substantial market share of this beef trade. A goal for them is to obtain 70 per 
cent of the beef import, which is similar to their domestic market share 
(Melchior, et al., 2012a; Nortura, 2013c), and thus to strengthen their role as a 
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meat supplier in Norway. Today, Nortura imports from all three exporters in 
Botswana and Namibia (Nortura, 2013c), has strong connection with the 
exporters, and is thus one of the main players in this beef trade.  
5.3 Stakeholder’s interests 
As discussed in chapter 4, the beef trade between Botswana and Namibia and 
Norway is regulated by quota allocations in all three countries. This might 
affect the bargaining power of the exporters and importers, and also limit the 
stakeholder’s choice of trading partners.  
The exporters in Botswana and Namibia seem to prefer that the quotas are 
allocated on a first-come, first-served (FCFS) basis in Norway, since Meatco 
and BMC have expressed that this arrangement is most beneficial for them. 
These two exporters dislike auction as an allocation method. They argue that 
the amounts spent on bids by Norwegian importers are an unnecessary cost, 
where the exporters in the end have to pick up the bill. Hence, the exporters 
would then be paid a lower import price for their beef. These firms also believe 
that an auction puts a constraint on which importer to trade with. The exporters 
can only trade with the importers who have received a quota share through 
bidding, and BMC argues that this arrangement increases the bargaining power 
of the demand side (Mguni, 2010).  
Norwegian importers have expressed mixed views regarding the two allocation 
methods. One importer argues that it is easier to adapt the beef import to 
seasonal demands in the Norwegian market and make it more predictable when 
auction is used as an allocation method. Adapting the import to demand peaks 
in Norway, could increase the value of the import and make it easier to brand 
the beef products. With a FCFS allocation, the trade is argued to be more 
controlled by the exporters and their needs. However, one importer admits that 
the exporters probably would receive less of the quota rent with auction 
allocation (Fatland, 2013). Some of the Norwegian importers also seem 
unsatisfied with the quota split in Namibia. Their main argument is that the 
importers get tied to the division and that it puts a restriction on how much beef 
they can purchase from each exporter. This situation has been more 
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complicated after Nortura’s entrance. Witvlei prefer to export to Nortura, and 
this has decreased the bargaining power of the other importers (Sleipnes, 2012). 
Some also question Nortura’s intentions with the trade, and argue that they have 
focused more on quantity rather than quality and brand building (Norsk Polar, 
2013a). The bargaining power of the exporters can further be a reason for why 
none of the importers have captured the whole quantity of 3,200 tons.  
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Chapter 6 
Distribution of the quota rent 
6.1 Main stakeholders  
As mentioned, there are theoretically four main stakeholders who can obtain a 
share of the quota rent from the beef trade; 1) Foreign exporters, 2) Domestic 
importers, 3) Domestic government and 4) Foreign government. In this 
particular trade, Botswana and Namibian cattle farmers are also important 
stakeholders. For simplicity, we have excluded Norwegian consumers as 
stakeholders. To answer the question of which of the stakeholders that benefit 
from the beef trade, we have tried to estimate the profitability of the trade at 
different levels of the value chain, from cattle farmers to Norwegian importers. 
First, we have considered the profitability for the foreign exporters and 
compared the prices obtained by Botswana and Namibian cattle farmers. 
Second, we have reviewed the potential profit gained by importers. Third, we 
have commented on the role of the domestic and foreign governments. We have 
finally summarized our findings in two main tables that review the quota rent 
distribution of the Norwegian beef trade with Botswana and Namibia.  
6.1.1 Exporters and cattle farmers in Botswana and Namibia 
One method to find out how much the exporters earn from the trade is to 
compare prices paid by Norwegian importers with EU import prices. A similar 
research was conducted by Sunnevåg (1999). The EU is an interesting export 
market to compare with Norway for several reasons. Both Botswana and 
Namibia regard the EU as the second most lucrative export market for beef 
after Norway. Since both countries currently are able to export beef duty-free 
and quota-free to the EU, the EU price indicates the alternative price that 
Botswana and Namibia could obtain for the beef that they export to Norway. It 
is plausible that Botswana and Namibia would export their Norwegian quota 
share to the EU if they were not able to export duty-free to Norway. Further, we 
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consider the EU to be a comparable example because we can assume that 
production costs for exporting to the EU and Norway are similar. Exporters 
face the same health and standard requirements for both markets. The 
transportation and insurance costs might also be considered similar, since most 
of the beef exported to Norway is transported through the EU (Noridane, 2013).   
In order to compare Norwegian and EU prices, we have first exploited the data 
on import value presented in chapter 1 to estimate the price paid by Norwegian 
importers to the exporters from 2008 to 2012. We have not obtained separate 
price data for the two different quota-schemes, and have therefore assumed that 
the prices paid to the exporters are the same under both quota-schemes.32 
Second, we have estimated the prices paid by EU importers to exporters in 
Botswana and Namibia. Third, we have compared prices for fresh/chilled (table 
6) and frozen beef (table 7) separately. These prices include transport and 
insurance costs. According to one of the Norwegian meat suppliers, the 
transportation cost is estimated to be 2-3 NOK per kilo (Noridane, 2013). We 
do not have exact information about the insurance cost.  
Table 6 compares price paid to Botswana and Namibian exporters by 
Norwegian and EU importers for one kilo of fresh/chilled boneless bovine 
meat. Norwegian import data separates the two different products; steaks and 
fillets and cuts of beef. The EU import data does not distinguish between these 
two products. In order to be able to compare the Norwegian and EU import 
price, we therefore reviewed the aggregated import of steaks and fillets and cuts 
of beef. The comparison indicates that Norwegian importers offer a much 
higher price than EU importers. Hence, the lucrative Norwegian beef prices 
seem to benefit the exporters. However, it is important to mention that the 
Norwegian prices might be higher due to the import composition. A large share 
of the Norwegian import of fresh/chilled beef consists of steaks and fillets 
(figure 11). As illustrated in chapter 1, the prices are higher for steaks and fillets 
than for other cuts of beef (figure 7 and 8). We do not know the composition of 
the EU import, and this makes our comparison less accurate.  
                                                 
32 Specific data for import price under the two different quotas are not publicly displayed. 
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Table 6: Prices paid by Norwegian and EU importers for fresh/chilled beef (boneless) (2008-
2012).  
Fresh or chilled (boneless)   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
              
Botswana             
Price paid by Norwegian 
importers   86,11 64,39 83,14 76,63 85,59 
Price paid by EU importers   37,70 39,94 35,77 40,18 36,12 
              
Namibia             
Price paid by Norwegian 
importers   71,09 68,81 72,60 99,95 104,96 
Price paid by EU importers   31,54 35,41 39,91 41,87 50,67 
 
Note: Commodity codes reviewed in this table are 02.01.3001 and 02.01.3009. Price is 
measured in NOK per kilo and is not adjusted for inflation. The EU price is estimated in NOK 
by using Norges Bank’s annual average exchange rate. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a), (EU 
Export Helpdesk, 2013) and (Norges Bank, 2013).   
Figure 12: Composition of Norwegian import of boneless fresh/chilled bovine meat from 
Botswana and Namibia (1996-2012). 
 
Note: The table exhibits Norwegian import quantity of the two commodity codes 02.01.3001 
(steaks and fillets) and 02.01.3009 (cuts of beef) from Botswana and Namibia. Source: 
(Statistics Norway, 2013a).  
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We obtained similar findings when we compared the prices for frozen boneless 
bovine meat (table 6). Also for frozen beef, the Norwegian importers offer a 
higher price than the EU importers. However, the same caveat is applicable 
here, since we do not have detailed data on the EU import composition. The 
Norwegian import composition of frozen beef is different from the composition 
of fresh and chilled (figure 12). Under frozen beef, Norway imports mostly cuts 
of beef. This could also to some extent explain the large differences between 
prices for fresh/chilled and frozen beef. 
For both fresh/chilled and frozen beef, Norway has offered higher prices than 
the EU between 2008 and 2012. The results indicate that some of the quota rent 
from the beef trade with Norway accrues the Botswana and Namibian 
exporters. This is similar to the results obtained by Sunnevåg (1999). However, 
it should be mentioned that he only reviewed the prices for cuts of beef.  
Table 7: Price paid by Norwegian and EU importers for frozen beef (boneless) (2008-2012). 
Frozen (boneless)   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
              
Botswana             
Price paid by Norwegian 
importers   31,18 38,45 34,71 38,36 42,19 
Price paid by EU importers   22,00 23,40 20,84 20,44 22,47 
              
Namibia             
Price paid by Norwegian 
importers   33,65 36,65 41,02 49,94 51,33 
Price paid by EU importers   14,80 22,20 22,29 24,53 28,70 
 
Note: Commodity codes reviewed in this table are 02.02.3001 and 02.02.3009. Price is 
measured in NOK per kilo. The EU price is estimated in NOK by using Norges Bank’s annual 
average exchange rate. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a), (EU Export Helpdesk, 2013) and 
(Norges Bank, 2013).   
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Figure 13: Composition of Norwegian import of boneless frozen bovine meat from Botswana 
and Namibia (1996-2012). 
 
Note: The table exhibits Norwegian import quantity of the two commodity codes 02.02.3001 
(steaks and fillets) and 02.02.3009 (cuts of beef) from Botswana and Namibia. Source: 
(Statistics Norway, 2013a). 
In order to review the potential surplus BMC can obtain when exporting beef to 
Norway, we have included the price paid to Botswana cattle farmers (table 8).  
Table 8: Price paid to Botswana farmers by BMC (2008-2012). 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price offered to farmer 2,74 4,78 6,69 5,01 4,30 
 
Note: The table exhibits the price paid to Botswana cattle farmers per kilo of cold dressed mass 
(CDM)33 of bovine meat. The prices are measured in NOK by using the estimated annual 
exchange rate from Pula to NOK and are not adjusted for inflation. Sources: (Botswana CSO, 
2013b) and (Oanda, 2013).  
These data show that there is a large price difference between the prices paid to 
farmers and the prices BMC can obtain in the Norwegian export market. For 
instance, BMC received a profit of 81 NOK per kilo for fresh/chilled beef in 
                                                 
33 CDM is the carcass mass after refrigeration, which is considered to be two to three per cent 
less than the carcass mass right after slaughter (Department of Agriculture Environmental 
Affairs and Rural Development, 2013).  
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2012. This price difference excludes the processing cost BMC faces. To further 
underline the potential profit of the Norwegian trade, we can compare import 
prices with Botswana domestic prices for beef. In 2012, the average price for 
one kilo of rump steak34 for consumers in towns and cities in Botswana was 
31.75 NOK35 (Botswana CSO, 2013c). Since BMC could sell beef to much 
higher prices to Norway, it is evident this export is very lucrative for BMC 
compared to selling in the domestic market.                                                                                                              
We have also included the price paid to Namibian cattle farmers (table 9). 
These are annual average prices, and do not separate between prices paid by 
different firms in Namibia. Compared to BMC, the Namibian firms pay a 
higher price to cattle farmers. In 2012, Namibian firms paid on average 18.17 
NOK per kilo to the cattle farmer, while BMC paid 4.30 NOK per kilo.   
Table 9: Average prices offered to Namibian farmers (2008-2012). 
Note: In this table we have used producer prices offered by the Namibian Meat Board as price 
offered to Namibian farmers. The prices are measured in NOK per kilo by using the estimated 
annual exchange rate from NAD to NOK and are not adjusted for inflation. Source: (The Meat 
Board of Namibia, 2013b), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2012), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 
2011c), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2010), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2009) and (Oanda, 
2013). 
Even if the Namibian firms pay higher prices to their farmers than BMC, the 
Namibian firms still profit from the Norwegian beef export. For example, in 
2012, Namibian exporters earned on average 86 NOK per kilo of exports of 
fresh/chilled beef. As for BMC, we do not know the exact processing costs for 
the Namibian firms.  
                                                 
34 Sirloin and tenderloin.  
35 We derived this price from estimating the average price for 2012 based on monthly prices 
from January to October. The price was then estimated in NOK by using the average annual 
exchange rate between Pula and NOK (Oanda, 2013).   
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Price offered to 
farmer 
14,12 14,67 16,78 18,09 18,17 
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6.1.2 Norwegian importers  
To review the potential profits of this trade for Norwegian importers, we have 
compared the import prices with a wholesale price. The wholesale price may 
indicate which price the importers can obtain for the imported beef from 
Norwegian retailers. However, there are as mentioned different types of 
importers and we do not have exact information about processing cost before 
the beef is sold to a retailer. We have estimated the average wholesale price for 
fresh steaks and fillets in Norway to 183 NOK per kilo. This price is calculated 
as an average of different wholesale prices provided from a source that wish to 
be anonymous. We have made the assumptions that this average wholesale 
price is applicable for all Norwegian wholesalers and similar for Norwegian 
beef and imported beef. The average Norwegian wholesale price is high 
compared with the import price for fresh/chilled beef (table 6), and the 
importers thus seem to gain from this trade.    
6.1.3 The governments of Botswana and Namibia 
We have no evidence indicating that the Botswana and Namibian governments 
directly profit from the beef trade. Both BMC and Meatco are partly owned by 
their respective governments. Since Meatco claims that the Namibian 
government has no financial interests in the company and BMC’s potential 
surplus is to accrue the famers of the co-operative, it seems unlikely that the 
two governments directly profit from the beef export to Norway. In addition, 
the quota allocation methods in Botswana and Namibia do not generate any 
profits for the governments.  
6.1.4 The Norwegian government  
Finally, the Norwegian government obtains some income through the auction of 
the EFTA/SACU quota. Figure 13 illustrates the annual income for the 
Norwegian government from this auction. Since the implementation of the 
quota in 2008, the price paid for licenses has varied significantly. As mentioned 
earlier, the bids seem to be more or less symbolic sums. The total revenue in 
2008 was exceptionally low, approximately 5000 NOK. The income record was 
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set in 2009, when the quota for 2010 was auctioned. The total revenue from the 
2010 quota was 8 million NOK. 
Figure 14: Auction revenues obtained by the Norwegian government (2008-2013). 
 
Note: The figure illustrates the annual revenue from the auction of the EFTA/SACU quota. 
Auction revenues are given in 1000 NOK. The rest bids are not included in the figure. The 
annual revenue is calculated by multiplying the different winning bids with the tons allocated. 
Source: (NAA, 2013b).36 
6.2 A summary of our findings 
The numbers from these illustrative examples are summarized in tables 10 and 
11. Table 10 is an illustration of the quota rent distribution in the Norwegian 
beef trade with Botswana for fresh/chilled steaks and fillets, while table 11 is a 
similar illustration for Namibia. It is important to mention that we do not have 
detailed information about the costs connected to this particular trade, except 
transportation costs. The transportation cost of 3 NOK per kilo is seemingly 
paid by Norwegian importers. The summary tables indicate that at least four 
stakeholders receive income from the quota-regulated beef trade. These 
stakeholders are: 1) Exporters in Botswana and Namibia, 2) Cattle farmers 3) 
Norwegian importers and 4) the Norwegian government. First, the foreign 
                                                 
36 For more detailed auction reports, see Appendix B. 
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exporters profit significantly from this beef trade. Seemingly, exporters receive 
higher prices in Norway than in other lucrative markets (recall table 6). In 
addition, there is a significant profit margin compared to the price the exporters 
pay their cattle suppliers. BMC pays a lower price to their cattle farmers than 
Namibian firms, but exporters in Namibia are paid a higher import price for 
their steaks and fillets. Hence, their surplus in tables 10 and 11 are quite similar. 
In 2012, BMC had a profit of approximately 80 NOK per kilo, while exporters 
in Namibia had a profit of approximately 87 NOK per kilo. As mentioned, one 
of the Namibian exporters is partially owned by Norwegian importers.  
Botswana and Namibian cattle farmers are important stakeholders in the 
Norwegian beef export. Our data do not examine the effects this trade have had 
on cattle farmers’ income. Meatco and Witvlei argue that their cattle farmers 
have profited from the high prices offered by Norwegian importers. However, 
there are seemingly mostly large commercial farmers that participate in this 
trade. In addition, the revenues from the trade with Norway are vital for all 
three export companies. If the preferential treatment ceases to exist, this could 
have severe income consequences for the cattle farmers.  
The Norwegian importers appear to obtain most profit from the trade, as the 
average calculated Norwegian wholesale price greatly exceeds the prices paid 
to exporters. In recent years, the import surplus from the trade with Namibia 
has decreased drastically. Import surplus under the EFTA/SACU quota has, 
from 2008 to 2012, decreased by 35 per cent. There is not much difference 
between import earnings under the GSP quota and the EFTA/SACU quota. As 
mentioned earlier, most of the quota bids have been symbolic sums. For 
instance, in 2008, the Norwegian government received 0.01 NOK per kilo. The 
highest earnings obtained were in 2010, when importers had to pay an average 
of 16 NOK per kilo to receive an import license. However, compared to the 
profits earned by importers and exporters, these sums are rather small. Hence, 
the auction revenues do not seem to reflect the true value of the quota rent and 
might indicate that the importers’ bidding behavior is not very competitive. The 
findings that both exporters and importers profit most from the trade are similar 
to that of Melchior (2005b), who was of the impression that “(…) at least 
exporters (…) and importers get some” (Melchior 2005b, p.18). 
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Table 10: Summary table of quota rent distribution of the Norwegian beef trade with Botswana (2008-2012). 
 
Note: This table summarizes our previous findings for the Norwegian beef trade with Botswana, and includes prices paid to the exporter (BMC) for fresh/chilled steaks and 
fillets. Prices are given in NOK per kilo, and are not adjusted for inflation. See tables 7 and 8 and figure 13 for a note on how the prices paid to exporters, the prices paid to 
farmers in Botswana and Norwegian auction revenues are calculated. In finding Norwegian auction revenues per kilo, we have divided the annual auction revenue on the 
amount imported under the EFTA/SACU quota.37 Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a), (Botswana CSO, 2013b), (Oanda, 2013) and (NAA, 2013b). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 For more detailed auction reports, see Appendix B. 
GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU
Farmer 2,74 2,74 4,78 4,78 6,69 6,69 5,01 5,01 4,3 4,3
Exporter 86,11 86,11 64,39 64,39 83,14 83,14 76,63 76,63 85,59 85,59
Bot. government
Surplus exporter 83,37 83,37 59,61 59,61 76,45 76,45 71,62 71,62 81,29 81,29
Transport 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Importer 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
No. Government 0,01 1,15 16,00 0,29 4,00
Surplus importer 93,89 93,88 115,61 114,46 96,86 80,86 103,37 103,08 94,41 90,41
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Table 11: Summary table of quota rent distribution of the Norwegian beef trade with Namibia (2008-2012). 
 
Note: This table summarizes our previous findings for the Norwegian beef trade with Namibia, and includes prices paid to exporters for fresh/chilled steaks and fillets. Prices 
are given in NOK per kilo, and are not adjusted for inflation. See tables 7 and 9 and figure 13 for a note on how the prices paid to exporters, the prices paid to farmers in 
Namibia, and Norwegian auction revenues are calculated. In finding Norwegian auction revenues per kilo, we have divided the annual auction revenue on the amount 
imported under the EFTA/SACU quota.38 Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2013b), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2012), (The Meat Board 
of Namibia, 2011c), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2010), (The Meat Board of Namibia, 2009) and (Oanda, 2013)
                                                 
38 For more detailed auction reports, see Appendix B. 
GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU GSP EFTA/SACU
Farmer 14,12 14,12 14,67 14,67 16,78 16,78 18,09 18,09 18,17 18,17
Exporter 71,09 71,09 68,81 68,81 72,60 72,60 99,95 99,95 104,96 104,96
Nam. government
Surplus exporter 56,97 56,97 54,14 54,14 55,82 55,82 81,86 81,86 86,79 86,79
Transport 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Importer 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
No. Government 0,01 1,15 16,00 0,29 4,00
Surplus importer 108,91 108,90 111,19 110,04 107,40 91,40 80,05 79,76 75,04 71,04
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Concluding remarks 
First of all, there are four main stakeholders in the Norwegian beef trade with 
Botswana and Namibia: 1) Exporters in Botswana and Namibia, 2) Cattle 
farmers, 3) Norwegian importers and 4) the Norwegian government. Our 
findings indicate that most of the quota rent seems to be divided between the 
importers and exporters. Compared to Norwegian wholesale prices, importers 
have a large profit margin on the imported beef. Exporters in Botswana and 
Namibia also receive substantial incomes from the trade. Especially, Namibian 
exporters have received a high import price in recent years. A large share of 
their exported beef products have been of high value, such as steaks and fillets. 
BMC, on the other hand, has obtained a high import price, but has struggled 
with foot and mouth disease since 2011. Consequently, the quantity exported to 
Norway has been reduced. We have no data which examine impact of the 
Norwegian trade on incomes of the cattle farmers. However, it can be argued 
that they seem to benefit from the trade. The Norwegian government also 
obtains some auction revenues. In absolute terms, these have been more or less 
symbolic sums.  
Theoretically, the choice of allocation method impacts the distribution of the 
quota rent. In our data, we have assumed that exporters receive the same import 
price, regardless of first-come, first-served (FCFS) or auction allocation. 
Exporting firms in Botswana and Namibia have expressed dissatisfaction with 
auctions, as it presumably reduces their bargaining power by limiting possible 
trading partners. The auction also reduces the profits of Norwegian importers. 
Theoretically, under FCFS, importers should capture the whole quota rent and 
therefore governments often prefer auction as a quota allocation tool, since it is 
intended to squeeze out importers’ profit and instead benefit the ‘state treasury’. 
In a perfectly competitive market the bids in an auction would reflect the size of 
the quota rent. In the Norwegian beef trade, there are many bidders competing 
for a quota licence, but the revenues gained from this auction do not seem to 
reflect the true value of the quota rent. Since the auction bids have remained 
very low so far, the impact on the importers’ profit has been minimal.  
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Importers should theoretically thus receive most of the profit. However, the 
exporters also gain large profits from this trade and the allocation method 
applied in Botswana and Namibia seems to matter for the distribution of the 
quota rent. Botswana and Namibia share the export quantity on an equal basis, 
and the Namibian share is split 50:50 between Meatco and Witvlei. This 
allocation has presumably reduced the bargaining power of Norwegian 
importers, since it has limited their choice of export partner. Further, another 
main reason why exporters gain from the trade is because Norwegian importers 
have paid higher prices in recent years.  
Exporters in Botswana and Namibia seem to prefer allocation through the FCFS 
method. This allocation method increases their bargaining power, and makes it 
possible for them to earn higher revenues. For Norwegian importers who wish 
to pay the highest possible price to the exporters, FCFS is the preferred method 
as well. If one does not assume that the exporters receive similar price, 
regardless of FCFS or auction, the auction can be a hindrance to this type of 
strategy, since the domestic government collects the auction revenues. Firms 
and governments face fewer costs under the FCFS allocation compared to an 
auction. However, under this quota-scheme, importers with low import-related 
costs and close relations with exporting firms might have an advantage. 
Norwegian importers have also expressed concerns about a “race to the border”, 
and argued that it is challenging to structure the import to meet Norwegian 
seasonal beef demand. The exporters can obtain higher earnings if they manage 
to understand this demand. Under an auction, it is easier for the importers to 
structure the beef import to seasonal demand. The method is also regarded as 
fair, securing equal rights to all participants, even though the auction revenues 
do not reflect the size of the quota rent.  
The beef trade seems to be justifiable in the light of the Norwegian political 
objectives, as it has enhanced the export revenues for the Botswana and 
Namibian exporters. The trade has also helped Witvlei to export to Europe. 
Without revenues from this trade, the financial situation for all firms would be 
difficult and could jeopardize jobs and incomes for the cattle farmers. However, 
if the goal is to contribute to economic development through highest possible 
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export revenues for these two countries, then a FCFS method might be more 
preferable than auction.  
Despite plans to take the beef trade out of the GSP-system and include all 3,200 
tons in the FTA between EFTA and SACU, the administration of the beef 
import will continue in the same way in the coming years. A concern, however, 
is that the Botswana and Namibian beef exports are not competitive on a global 
scale. The preferential beef trade with Norway has, to a large extent, made the 
exporting firms heavily dependent on trade regimes governed by development 
policies and not on free markets. Meatco is a firm who seems to be concerned 
about its future competitiveness, and have focused more on branding and high 
quality products. The beef sector in Namibia is still however strongly 
subsidized by the Namibian government. Hence, preference erosion is a major 
concern for all three exporters, which raises questions about how sustainable 
the export revenues from the Norwegian beef trade really are.  
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Appendix 
A. Commodities allowed imported under the EFTA/SACU 
quota. 
Commodity code Description 
02.01 Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 
02.01.1000 Carcasses and half-carcasses 
  Other cuts with bone-in 
02.01.2001 
"Compensated quarters”, i. e. forequarters and 
hindquarters  
  of the same animal presented at the same time 
02.01.2002 Other forequarters 
02.01.2003 Other hindquarters 
02.01.2004 So-called "Pistola-cuts" 
02.01.2008 Other 
  Boneless 
02.01.3001 Beef steaks and fillets 
02.01.3009 Other 
02.02 Meat of bovine animals, frozen 
02.02.1000 Carcasses and half-carcasses 
  Other cuts with bone-in 
02.02.2001 
"Compensated quarters”, i. e. forequarters and 
hindquarters  
  of the same animal presented at the same time 
02.02.2002 Other forequarters 
02.02.2003 Other hindquarters 
02.02.2004 So-called "Pistola-cuts" 
02.02.2008 Other 
  Boneless 
02.02.3001 Beef steaks and fillets 
02.02.3009 Other 
Source: (EFTA/SACU, 2006) and (NC, 2013a). 
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B. Auction reports from the NAA.39 
2008 BW/NA - quota 
  
   Total quantity  500 000 
 Minimum price  0,01 
 
   Firm  Allocated quantity  Bid per unit  
Nor-Frost AS 50000 0,01 
Food Restructuring AS 200000 0,01 
Holst Foods AS 200000 0,01 
Skandia Foods AS 45000 0,01 
   Total quantity allocated  495000 
 Source: (NAA, 2013b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Auction reports (from 2008 to 2013) show participants, bids, minimum winning bid, bid winners and 
quantity allocated to the winners. More detailed information can be retrieved from auksjon2.slf.dep.no. 
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2009 BW/NA – quota 
  
   Total quantity  500 000 
 Minimum price  1,15 
 
   
   Firm  Allocated quantity  Bid per unit  
Quality Food AS 40000 1,16 
Holst Food AS 80000 1,15 
Food Restructuring AS 80000 1,15 
Skandia Foods 80000 1,15 
Fatland Jæren AS 80000 1,15 
Ultimat AS 20000 1,15 
Johannessens import og investering 20000 1,15 
Rieber og Søn ASA 80000 1,15 
Frysekompaniet Holding AS 20000 1,15 
Norsk Kjøtthandel AS 0 1,06 
Kulinar Invest AS 0 0,16 
Norsk Polar AS 0 0,04 
Keep Holding AS 0 0,02 
Frysekompaniet Holding AS 0 0,01 
EAJ Holding AS 0 0,01 
Nordicfood AS  0 0,01 
Kulinar AS 0 0,01 
T L Måkestad AS 0 0,01 
MAK Food AS 0 0,01 
Sinober AS 0 0,01 
Hetland Import AS 0 0,01 
   Total quantity allocated  500000 
 Source: (NAA, 2013b). 
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2010 BW/NA – quota 
  
   Total quantity  500 000 
 Minimum price  16 
 
   
   Firm  Allocated quantity  Bid per unit  
Nortura SA 80000 16,01 
Kontiki Foods AS 80000 16,01 
Johannessens import og investering 10000 16,01 
A la Carte Produkter AS 572 16 
Holst Food AS 143229 16 
Food Restructuring AS 143229 16 
Fatland Jæren AS 42968 16 
Quality Food AS 0 10,54 
Brødrene Michelsen AS 0 5 
Norsk Kjøtthandel AS 0 4,5 
Rieber og Søn ASA 0 0,01 
Ultimat AS 0 0,01 
Norsk Polar AS 0 0,01 
Kulinar Invest AS 0 0,01 
Total quantity allocated 499998 
 Source: (NAA, 2013b). 
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2011 SACU – quota 
  
   Total quantity  500 000 
 Minimum price  0,05 
 
   
   Firm  Allocated quantity  Bid per unit  
Nortura SA 125000 1 
Rema Trading AS 15000 0,06 
Norsk Kjøtthandel AS 40000 0,06 
Nor-Frost AS 5000 0,06 
Ultimat AS 20000 0,06 
JTS Gourmet AS 368 0,05 
Kontiki Foods AS 92072 0,05 
Norsk Polar AS 18414 0,05 
Food Restructuring AS 92072 0,05 
Holst Food AS 92072 0,05 
   Total quantity allocated 499998 
 Source: (NAA, 2013b). 
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2012 SACU – quota 
  
   Total quantity  500 000 
 Minimum price  4 
 
   
   Firm  Allocated quantity  Bid per unit  
Rema Trading AS 50000 4,01 
Kontiki Foods AS 150000 4,01 
Holst Food AS  104166 4 
BM-Food Hanssen Nygaard AS 104166 4 
Nor-Frost AS 8333 4 
Norsk Polar AS 41666 4 
Ultimat AS 41666 4 
Stabburet AS 0 3,8 
Quality Food AS 0 3,23 
Nortura SA 0 3 
Norsk Kjøtthandel AS 0 0,75 
Rieber og Søn ASA 0 0,51 
Coop Norge Handel AS 0 0,5 
   Total quantity allocated 499997 
 Source: (NAA, 2013b). 
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2013 SACU – quota 
  
   Total quantity  500 000 
 Minimum price  9,23 
 
   
   Firm  Allocated quantity  Bid per unit  
Noridane Foods AS 175000 9,25 
Rema Trading AS 50000 9,24 
Norsk Polar AS 95930 9,23 
Holst Food AS  108720 9,23 
BM-Food Hanssen Nygaard AS 70348 9,23 
Nor-Frost AS 0 9,21 
NK Import AS 0 8 
Ultimat AS 0 4,3 
Brødrene Michelsen AS 0 2 
Kontiki Foods AS 0 2 
C&E Gastro-Import AS 0 0,01 
   Total quantity allocated 499998 
 Source: (NAA, 2013b).
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C. Norwegian import quantity under the GSP quota and EFTA/SACU quota. 
 
 
 
Note: The table exhibits Norwegian import quantity under the GSP quota and EFTA/SACU quota, from Botswana and Namibia (1996-2012). Numbers are 
listed in tons. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a).
Fresh or chilled (boneless) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Botswana
2013001 111,4 70,363 118,772 140,113 98 304,84 119,737 156,002 73,231 345,621 269,409 200,776 35,557 168,11 207,103 157,552 168,871
2013009 108,9 417,66 728,052 153,578 29,199 28,433 0 14,317 104,716 130,614 0 124,377 0 0 0 0 0
Namibia
2013001 159,9 0 0 59,741 18,2 30,31 136,643 231,291 62,294 365,35 412,143 339,412 736,894 511,309 390,964 1415,98 1348,385
2013009 0 0 0 158,123 0 15,469 76,033 15,137 75,85 122,164 21,56 158,037 89,378 0 0 14,055 81,177
Frozen (boneless) 
Botswana 
2023001 335,5 109,3 51,825 53,461 250,073 321,508 46,155 112,212 64,867 45,666 44,374 21,42 40,951 68,261 0 54,006 0
2023009 145 1278 1140,61 915,26 482,27 1102,99 770,331 647,079 1081,71 1066,375 1352,307 1192,919 1036,45 1056,211 1366,166 212,348 198,53
Namibia
2023001 637,9 0 0 36,484 180,71 88,955 272,608 212,705 112,221 237,781 108,584 42,56 131,761 19,145 247,695 136,464 162,518
2023009 121,5 0 55,72 404,264 289,211 878,834 1185,04 1078,47 1111,09 390,806 424,253 618,344 1115,58 1376,289 995,557 1178,1 1012,604
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D. Norwegian import value under the GSP quota and EFTA/SACU quota. 
 
 
 
Note: The table exhibits Norwegian import value under the GSP quota and EFTA/SACU quota, from Botswana and Namibia (1996-2012). Numbers are listed 
NOK (million), and not adjusted for inflation. Source: (Statistics Norway, 2013a).
Fresh or chilled (boneless) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Botswana
2013001 5,585 4,034 6,187 8,143 5,190 12,674 5,311 7,147 3,983 18,032 16,711 11,111 3,062 10,824 17,218 12,074 14,453
2013009 2,903 17,965 33,492 8,532 1,714 1,419 0,000 0,626 4,559 5,619 0,000 6,917 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Namibia
2013001 6,978 0,000 0,000 3,496 0,499 1,449 6,515 10,698 3,565 20,247 28,075 21,770 53,899 35,185 28,385 142,291 145,293
2013009 0,000 0,000 0,000 7,098 0,000 0,599 3,724 0,645 3,460 5,633 0,819 9,858 4,842 0,000 0,000 0,642 4,753
Frozen (boneless) 
Botswana 
2023001 9,167 2,892 1,361 1,525 7,930 10,225 1,759 5,162 2,337 2,273 2,068 0,881 1,397 4,765 0,000 2,485 0,000
2023009 3,771 34,881 33,323 25,956 12,555 30,125 20,453 18,110 33,524 31,013 49,193 40,908 32,196 38,476 47,426 7,732 8,377
Namibia
2023001 17,398 0,000 0,000 1,060 4,928 2,509 11,193 9,267 5,565 9,796 4,308 1,411 4,378 1,364 13,950 8,199 9,752
2023009 3,075 0,000 1,558 11,428 8,142 23,961 31,212 31,619 35,383 13,329 17,616 21,097 37,596 49,784 37,044 57,447 50,570
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